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ABSTRACT 
Globally institutional investors are taking an increased interest in companies’ 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure and their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) performance. Although the relationship between a company’s 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) and its institutional shareholding has been 
studied in a number of developed economies, this study fills a gap in the literature by 
investigating this link for JSE listed companies. Using Bloomberg’s ESG and individual 
environmental, social, and governance disclosure scores as proxies for CSP, panel 
data regression methodologies are applied to a sample of 98 companies (254 
company years) listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2016 to 
investigate the link between the different forms of CSP and institutional shareholding 
in South Africa. The study fails to establish a relationship between institutional 
shareholding and environmental and social based CSP, but finds a statistically 
significant positive relationship for governance based CSP. The results imply that, of 
the three CSP components, South African institutional shareholders in the studied 
sample mainly consider the governance component in their investment decisions, 
possibly because good corporate governance is associated with improved financial 
performance and the adoption of sustainability policies by the company.  
Keywords: 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Social Performance, Environmental, 
Social and Governance disclosure, institutional investors, South Africa 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
There are increasing expectations for corporations to not only do well in terms of 
financial returns for their shareholders, but also to be responsible corporate citizens 
that address the concerns of external stakeholders. The operational decisions of 
companies are expected to take into account social and environmental issues 
affecting their employees, customers and the general society (Emami, Nazari & 
Pour, 2014). There is now an expectation that the business operations must feature 
measureable Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) targets in addition to the 
financial performance targets. In other words, companies must be able to measure 
their Corporate Social Performance (CSP). 
Kok et al. (2001) defines CSR as the ‘obligation of the company to use its resources 
in ways that help society, through committed participation as a member of society, by 
considering the society at large and improving its welfare independent of any direct 
financial benefits to the company’ (p.87). The term CSR generally refers to actions 
taken by the company with respect to its employees, communities and the 
environment that go beyond what is legally required of the company (Barnea & 
Rubin, 2010). 
The current literature on CSR is indicates; that institutional investors are one of the 
stakeholders who are taking a huge interest in sustainability issues, typically 
categorised as a company’s Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) activities. 
For example, according to the sustainable investment report by Siddy (2009), in 
Europe many asset owners like pension funds are now requesting that their fund 
managers integrate ESG criteria into their investment analysis. The same report 
quotes the US Social Investment Forum (US SIF)1 that socially responsible 
investment (SRI) funds now account close to 11 percent of all assets under 
professional management. Furthermore, although SRI funds still account for a small 
portion of the US asset management industry, they are rising fast in Europe and 
Australia (Brammer et al., 2009). A report by Eurosif, a leading European association 
1 The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (US SIF) is a U S based membership 
association that promotes sustainable, responsible and impact investing across all asset classes (US 
SIF, 2017). 
2 
for the promotion and advancement of social responsible investments, estimates that 
SRI funds now represent over 17 per cent of the assets under professional 
management in Europe (Siddy, 2009). Legislation is similarly increasingly supporting 
responsible investing – for example, the UK Government has enacted laws that 
compel public pension funds to take ESG issues into consideration in their 
investment decisions (Cox et al., 2004). 
The interest in ESG issues by institutional investors is not only being observed in the 
developed economies. In South Africa, CSR has been encouraged by a number of 
independent institutions who are concerned about responsible investments and want 
to show good corporate citizenship. Unlike the UK, South Africa, like the rest of the 
developing world, doesn’t have laws which require big institutional investors like 
pension funds to consider ESG factors in their investment decisions. Therefore, most 
local investment actions encompassing ESG principles have been voluntary. A good 
example of these voluntary initiatives is the stance taken by the Government 
Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), which controls and manages the pension fund 
assets of all state employees in the country, and has stated an intention use its large 
investment positions to push for greater governance, social responsibility and 
environmental protection (Viviers et al., 2009). 
In addition, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), Africa’s largest stock 
exchange, in 2004 created the JSE Social Responsible Investments Index where 
listed companies in the FTSE/JSE All Share Index are reviewed annually against a 
holistic set of ESG issues. Specifically, the index was designed to reflect the 
complex nature of sustainability and social responsibility issues in South Africa.  
Apart from the initiatives of the JSE, South Africa also has the Southern African 
Impact Investing Network (SAIIN), which was started in 2009 by GreaterImpact2 and 
sponsored by Cadiz Asset Management, to promote impact investing in South Africa 
(SAIIN, 2015). The first SAIIN conference in 2010 attracted more than 100 
participants across multiple disciplines, ranging from large financial institutions to 
2 GreaterImpact is a South African advisory firm specialising in Impact investments
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banks, asset management companies to developmental financial institutions, 
showing that there is general support for such CSR initiatives in the country.  
Another report on the state of responsible investment in South Africa commissioned 
by the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEPFI) in 
collaboration with the University of South Africa (UNISA), estimated that at most 15% 
of the pension fund assets in the country were managed under responsibility 
investment strategies, while the figure for asset management companies was 11% 
(De Jongh et al., 2007).  
Identifying the importance of sustainability issues into the investment decisions, the 
Institute of Directors South Africa (IoDSA) established the Committee on 
Responsible Investing by Institutional Investors in South Africa. The committee went 
on to launch the Code for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA) in 2011, 
with the codes being effective from 2012 (Institute of Directors South Africa , 2011). 
The code gives formal guidance to institutional investors such pension funds, 
insurance companies, and asset and mutual funds managers, on how they should 
incorporate ESG factors in their investment decisions. The code is not only endorsed 
by the Association for Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA) and the 
Principal Officers Association (POA), but has also received support from other 
important organisations in the South African financial market, such as the Financial 
Services Board (FSB) and the JSE. According to Institute of Directors South Africa 
(2011) the creation of CRISA made South Africa the only country after the UK to 
formally encourage institutional investors to include ESG factors in their investment 
decisions 
The huge interest by institutional investors in companies’ CSR activities can be 
explained by the fact that companies with good CSP have been linked to lower 
investment risk. Spicer (1978) reported that companies which have good 
environmental management systems are associated with good financial performance 
and present low investment risks, as they are less likely to incur huge environmental 
penalties and fines from the authorities. Therefore good CSP is associated with 
reduced regulatory risks. Neubaum and Zahra (2006) observes that creating an 
organisational culture that puts a greater focus on maintaining good relations with all 
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the critical stakeholders of the company and caring about the environment, require 
long-term investments of resources over a great period of time. These relationships 
built on mutual respect with the stakeholders, represents valuable intangible assets 
to the company, and the actions cannot be easily copied by rival companies, giving 
the company a significant advantage over its competitors.  
Based on the observation that institutional investors often have a big share portfolio 
which includes a variety of shares in different companies in different industries, 
Bushee et al. (2013) suggests that due to the high investment monitoring costs of 
institutional investors they are likely to prefer companies with strong internal 
monitoring mechanisms in the form of good corporate governance, which can act as 
a substitute for the institutional investors’ own costly monitoring activities. 
Furthermore, due to the large shareholding they often own in the companies 
compared to other investors, institutional investors have become involuntary long-
term investors (Greening & Johnson, 1999). For example, Michaely and Vincent 
(2012) point out that institutional investors owned more than 78 percent of 
outstanding shares in US companies by the end of 2009. To highlight the 
significance of institutional investors as an investment group in the South African 
economy, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)3 
(2013) report, which was presented at the meeting of the G20 Finance Ministers and 
Central Banks Governors in 2013 in Russia, showed that South Africa has one the 
largest pension fund industries both in absolute terms and in relation to its economy, 
at over 60% of GDP, putting the country at the same level as developed countries 
such as the UK, US and Canada. The large investment holdings have made it hard 
for institutional investors to exit those investments without affecting the share price of 
the company (Greening & Johnson, 1999).  
The benefits of CSR investments accrue over the long-term, and for the majority of 
the institutional investors this has meant that they become supporters of good 
corporate governance, and through shareholders activism have tried to influence the 
executive management of the many companies to consider ESG factors when 
3 OECD an international organisation of 34 free economy countries. Its stated goal is the ‘promotion of 
policies that aim to improve the economic and social well-being of people around all over the world ‘ 
(OECD, 2017) 
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making business decisions (Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Neubaum & Zahra, 2006). The 
institutional shareholders use their large investment holdings to influence 
management to consider CSR issues in companies’ operational plans, as means of 
ensuring the long-term sustainability of their investments and ensuring their invested 
companies gain a competitive advantage over their competitors (Neubaum & Zahra, 
2006; Greening & Johnson, 1999). For the management of the different companies 
this means that if they want their company’s shares to be attractive to one of the 
largest investment group in the financial markets, they need ensure that they are 
addressing the ESG concerns of institutional investors (Graves & Waddock, 1994). 
The motivation of why management would want their company to be attractive to 
institutional investors, is the fact that their financial rewards are often linked to 
performance of the company’s share price, a practice that is fairly prevalent in the 
South African financial market (Crotty & Bonorchis, 2006). It is crucial for 
management to attract institutional investors because investments by institutional 
investors have been found to have a positive effect on the company’s share price. 
This is because investments by institutional investors often result in reduction in 
information asymmetry between the company and its other investors (Kim & Cheong, 
2015; Huyghebaert & Van Hulle 2004).  Institutional shareholding also contributes to 
the liquidity of a company’s shares and has been found to improve share price 
discovery (Aguilar, 2013; Huyghebaert & Van Hulle 2004) 
One of the useful tools that companies use to inform both the general public and 
their investors on their CSR activities, is through their published annual financial 
statements, press releases, and standalone CSR disclosure reports. This is defined 
as CSR disclosure from the perspective of the company, and from the perspective of 
investors this is defined as ESG disclosure. Bushee and Noe (2000) says that 
corporate disclosure practices of companies could be very important to institutional 
investors who depend on public disclosures for information of the corporate 
governance activities of companies. The CSR literature includes a significant number 
of research studies that have used ESG disclosure as proxy to measure a 
company’s CSP (see, for example, Healy et al., 1999; Bushee & Noe, 2000; Hoq et 
al., 2010; Khumalo & Pitt, 2015; Clarkson et al., 2008) and the current study 
continues with this trend. 
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1.2 Problem Statement 
A majority of the prominent studies on the relationship between CSP and institutional 
shareholding have found evidence that supports the assertion that increased CSP 
often attracts greater institutional investors (see, for example, Hansen & Hill, 1991; 
Graves & Waddock, 1994; Cox et al., 2004; Mahoney & Roberts, 2007; Saleh et al., 
2010). The assumed reason behind this positive relationship is that from a portfolio 
management point of view, the majority of institutional investors view CSR activities 
as a mitigant to a great number of operational risks faced by the company and 
therefore companies with good CSP are associated with lower investment risk as 
explained above. This means given the opportunity to choose between two similar 
companies one with bad CSP and the other with a good CSP, institutional investors 
are more likely to invest in the company with better CSP as they are able to achieve 
the same return with a lower investment risk (Graves & Waddock, 1994).  
Within a Stakeholder and Legitimacy Theory framework (see Section 2.1.1 and 
2.1.2), the problem that this study attempts to address is therefore whether South 
African companies who have shown greater commitment to CSR issues and/or 
disclosure attract an increased number of institutional investors as shareholders.  
Secondly, within a Portfolio Theory context (see Section 2.1.3), this study indirectly 
attempts to establish whether institutional shareholders in South Africa take into 
account ESG factors in additional to financial performance when making investment 
decisions. 
1.3 Purpose of Research 
The purpose of this study is to investigate a potential relationship between CSP and 
institutional shareholding for a large sample of publicly held South African 
companies. The aim is to find out whether the CSP (and CSR disclosure) of a 
company influences the number of institutional investors holding the shares in the 
company, by using Bloomberg’s ESG disclosure scores, a multi-attribute rating 
system widely recognized as one of the proxies of CSP (Han et al., 2016).  This 
allows the research study to test for the above relationship using both a composite 
measure of CSP represented by the overall Bloomberg ESG disclosure score, as 
well as the different forms of CSP represented by the Bloomberg Environmental, 
Social, and Governance individual disclosure scores. 
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1.4 Benefits of the study 
The study provides fresh evidence in the South African context concerning the 
relationship between CSP and institutional shareholding. The investigation is from an 
emerging market perspective, which is important as the majority of the current 
literature on the topic has been from developed nations (for examples see Hansen & 
Hill, 1991; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Greening & Johnson, 1999; Cox et al., 2004).   
Additionally the majority of the South African research on CSR has mainly focused 
on the sustainability reporting trends by South African companies (see Visser, 2004; 
Heese, 2005; Van Zyl, 2013; Vos & Reddy, 2014). This is to the author’s knowledge 
the first study to investigate how CSR disclosure by these companies affects their 
institutional shareholding.  
This study therefore addresses a research gap that exists in the understanding of the 
relationship between institutional shareholding and CSP and CSR, within emerging 
markets in general, and South Africa in particular. 
1.5 Chapter Outline 
The remainder of this document is organised as follows. Chapter 2 begins with a 
discussion on theoretical predictions of the relationship between CSP and 
institutional shareholding, and provides empirical findings of previous studies on the 
link between institutional shareholding and CSP. Chapter 3 explains the data and 
methodology used in this study. Chapter 4 consists of a comparative discussion of 
the findings of this research study in relation to previous studies done on the subject 
being investigated. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes and puts forward suggestions for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following section highlights the theoretical predictions of the relationship 
between institutional shareholding and CSP. The empirical findings on the 
relationship from both developed economies and the emerging markets are 
discussed next, leading to the research hypothesis. 
2.1 Theoretical predictions for the relationship between CSP and Institutional 
shareholding 
The relationship between environmental disclosure and a company’s institutional 
shareholding can be explained in terms of three theories, namely the Legitimacy 
Theory, the Stakeholder Theory, and the Portfolio Theory.  The Stakeholder and 
Legitimacy Theories explain why companies engage in CSR disclosure, and the 
Portfolio Theory explains why institutional investors are likely to invest in companies 
will better CSP. 
2.1.1 Stakeholder Theory 
      The Stakeholder Theory says that companies need to ensure their survival and 
continued success by making sure that they satisfy the majority of their stakeholders’ 
demands, failing which they will be faced with unpleasant confrontations from their 
stakeholders (Roberts, 1992; Huang et al., 2010).  
   This means that the different stakeholders need to be managed to ensure their 
continued support, and ultimately ensure that the company achieves its corporate 
objectives (Mahadeo et al., 2011). It is in this context that CSR reporting by 
companies is seen as part of a mechanism whose role is to mitigate any action that 
may be detrimental to the company meeting its corporate objectives (Mahadeo et al., 
2011). This suggests that companies have gone through an exercise of identifying 
who their target audience is, and will provide information that will influence that 
specific group - this is regarded as stakeholder dialogue. An open dialogue and 
interaction between the company and its stakeholders creates what Habisch and 
Moon (2006) define as social capital, which in an important asset to the company 
and has the benefit of ensuring that the company continues to operate successfully.  
9 
      Mahadeo et al (2011) talks about the managerial (instrumental) branch of 
stakeholder theory, which specifically focuses on the need to control stakeholders 
who are perceived to have a more direct and critical impact on the company, as 
these stakeholders can withdraw or redirect resources meant for the company, 
thereby endangering its existence. Davenport (2000) classifies stakeholders into five 
categories namely: customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, and 
communities. Institutional investors fall under shareholders and due to the size of 
funds they manage on behalf of their clients (and in the South African context have 
invested in the JSE), it is reasonable to assume that they fall into this critical 
category of stakeholders. 
2.1.2 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy Theory is based on the idea that in order for a business to access the 
necessary resources in needs to operate successfully now and in the future, the  
company should all the time act within the limits of what society identifies as socially 
acceptable behaviour (Deegan, 2002). Legitimacy theory proposes that a company, 
unlike a natural person, has no inherent right to exist, but rather is granted a social 
license to operate by society (Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). This means that such 
legitimacy afforded to the company can be immediately threatened if the society 
views the company as operating outside the prevailing acceptable societal norms.   
Companies who view themselves as good corporate citizens and are compliant with 
the prevailing societal laws will attempt to differentiate themselves from those that 
are not, by making sure that they report on their good CSP as a way of legitimising 
their existence. This means the voluntary CSR disclosure by companies, where they 
highlight their CSP and accomplishments, form part of their legitimisation strategies, 
as this is one way in which companies can show that they are good corporate 
citizens and are contributing to the betterment of the society. It can be concluded 
then that one way in which companies can effectively be held accountable for their 
operations is for them to engage in comprehensive voluntary CSR disclosure. 
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2.1.3 Portfolio Theory 
   Portfolio theory explains why institutional shareholders are more likely to invest in 
companies with better CSP than those without. The theory also contributes to the 
understanding of the relationship between institutional shareholding and a 
company’s CSP.  
Modern portfolio theory defines investment return as a function of risk, and suggests 
that investment decisions by investors should always take into account both the rate 
of returns and the level of risk (Cox et al., 2004). In addition to financial risks, there 
are other operational risks that the company is exposed to. It has been suggested 
that CSP reduces legal risks as well as regulatory risks (Spicer, 1978). This means 
that companies who regularly engage in CSR activities should represent a lower 
investment risk. There is enough empirical evidence showing that institutional 
investors are risk averse, and it can therefore be expected that institutional investors 
will find CSR useful only if it reduces the risk of their investment (Chaganti & 
Damanpour, 1991). As a result it is expected that institutional investors will prefer 
investing in companies with high levels of CSP, due to the same return being 
possible with less risk (Graves & Waddock, 1994). In other words, one expects 
companies with good CSP to be able attract a greater amount of institutional 
investments that those who have poor CSP. 
2.2 The diverse preferences for CSP by institutional investors 
Even though the majority of the studies into the relationship between CSP and 
institutional shareholding have found a positive relationship between the two 
(examples include Hansen & Hill, 1991; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Greening & 
Johnson, 1999; Cox et al., 2004), Neubaum and Zahra (2006) points out that one 
should not expect that all institutional shareholders will hold the same view when it 
comes to the company’s CSR investments, as their incentives are not always the 
same.  
Therefore, institutional investors have to be classified into different categories, 
namely short-term and long-term investors, since it has been shown that not only do 
they hold different motivations for their investment decisions, but they also have 
different time horizons for their investments (Bushee & Noe, 2000; Greening & 
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Johnson, 1999; Cox et al., 2004; Neubaum & Zahra, 2006). Due to these 
differences, it has been argued that the different institutional investors will have their 
own unique as well as potentially conflicting preferences, for companies’ CSR 
activities (Greening & Johnson, 1999; Cox et al., 2004; Neubaum & Zahra, 2006).   
An example of short-term institutional shareholders are mutual funds, unit trusts, 
investment trusts, and investment banks (Cox et al., 2004; Johnson & Greening, 
1999). The investment behaviour of short-term institutional investors is based on 
Myopic Institutions Theory developed by Hansen and Hill (1991). According to 
Myopic Institutions Theory, the investment decision taken by institutional 
shareholders tend to be more short-sighted than those of individual investors 
(Hansen & Hill, 1991; Graves & Waddock, 1994). It is hypothesized that short-
sightedness happens because the people who are employed and are working for 
these institutions compete for client accounts, and thus their performance and 
financial rewards are reviewed and rewarded on the basis of their annual or quarterly 
performance. This means this particular group of institutional investors only consider 
short-term financial rewards when making investment decisions. 
There is also general consensus in the literature that the investment costs of CSR 
are incurred in the short-term while the returns are only realised in the long-term 
(Neubaum & Zahra, 2006). Short-term investors tend to avoid CSR investments as 
they present long-term investment commitments with uncertain outcomes, and rather 
focus on maximizing financial returns in the short term (Cox & Wicks, 2011).  
On the other hand, pension funds and life insurance are classified as long-term 
institutional investors, due to them being known for investing for longer periods of 
time and having predictable cash outflows (Ryan and Schneider, 2002). In addition, 
these institutions often hold large investments in their investment portfolios (Fauzi et 
al., 2007; Johnson & Greening, 1999). These large investments usually restrict them 
from making quick changes to their investments (Greening & Johnson, 1999). 
Compelled to stay invested for longer periods of time, they can be expected to 
support CSR initiatives in the companies they are invested in, as CSR initiatives are 
seen as mitigating possible future risks to their investments (Cox & Wicks, 2011; 
Kruse & Lundbergh, 2010).  
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In order to investigate the relationship between CSP and institutional shareholding, 
some studies have taken the approach of separating the different institutional 
shareholders while others did not. The literature is filled with a variety of institutional 
investors, but for the studies that decided to split the institutional shareholders into 
different categories, the common approach has been to split institutional 
shareholders into short-term and long-term institutional shareholders. 
The next section discusses research studies on the relationship between CSP and 
institutional shareholding that focus on developed economies. The research literature 
on the link between CSP and institutional shareholding is very sparse, with less than 
twenty studies that that were found by the author. In contrast, studies on the impact 
of institutional shareholders on CSP are far more plentiful4, but are not relevant to 
the focus of the present research study 
2.3 Empirical findings on the relationship between CSP and institutional 
shareholding from developed economies. 
The first study to investigate the relationship the between CSP and institutional 
shareholding was done by Coffey & Fryxell (1991). The purpose of this study was to 
provide new research findings about the relationship between institutional 
shareholding and different dimensions of CSP.  The rationale behind using CSP 
comprising several dimension is that CSP is a multi-dimensional construct (Carroll, 
1979), and it is likely that the relationship with institutional shareholding may differ 
across these dimensions of CSP. Using a sample of 110 USA Fortune 500 
companies in 1984, Coffey and Fryxell (1991) study categorised CSP into the 
dimensions of corporate social responsiveness, charitable donations, and social 
issues management. Charitable donations was defined as the proportion of pre-tax 
earnings donated to charities, whilst corporate social responsiveness was measured 
as the number of women representatives sitting on the board of directors of the 
companies featured in the research. Social issues management was measured by 
4 See, for example, Roberts (1992); Delgado-Garcia et al. (2010); Arora and Dharwadkar (2011); Oh et 
al., (2011); Harjoto and Jo (2011); Rees and Rodionova (2012); Calza et al. (2013); and Dam and 
Scholtens (2013). 
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the company’s compliance with the Sullivan principles5, which related to policies by a 
company regarding its presence in Apartheid South Africa, a highly controversial 
issue in the time the study was done. The study established a positive relationship 
between the institutional shareholding as a percentage of shares held by institutional 
shareholders, and the number of women representatives on the board of directors. 
However, no statistically significant relationship as found between institutional 
shareholding and charitable donations. Social issues management, on the other 
hand, showed a surprising negative relationship with institutional shareholding. 
The researchers noted that due to the use of cross-sectional data they were 
uncertain with regards to the direction of the relationship between institutional 
shareholding and the number of women represented on the sample companies’ 
boards. The study could not determine with precision whether institutional investors 
were attracted to companies that have women on their boards or if the institutional 
investors were the ones influencing the hiring of women on company’s board of 
directors.  
According to the study the latter could happen somewhat unintentionally if there are 
more women already sitting in top management in the investor company or if board 
size were to increase with the introduction of institutional investment. There is a 
suggestion that there is a possibility that institutional investors actually promote and 
advocate that the board must be diverse, based on the belief that a diverse board 
with more woman will improve the company’s performance. The conclusion was that 
it was likely that each of these possibilities working together could explain the 
positive relationship between the two variables. 
Coffey and Fryxell (1991) and Graves and Waddock (1994) conducted further 
studies on the relationship between institutional shareholding and CSP, based on 
two theoretical predictions - Myopic Institutions Theory, and the theoretical prediction 
of the relationship between CSP and investment risk (i.e. Portfolio Theory). The latter 
predicts that institutional investors are expected invest more heavily in companies 
with strong corporate social performance, and is based on the earlier study done by 
Spicer (1978), which showed that institutional investors consider companies with 
5 These are the names of two corporate codes of conduct, developed by a US preacher Rev. Leon 
Sullivan to promote CSR (Lashgari & Gant, 1989). 
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lower CSP to be riskier investments. The research study by Spicer (1978) of 18 US 
pulp and paper companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange between 1970  
and 1972, showed that there is moderate to strong correlation between the observed 
investment risk of a company and how it handles and responds to CSR issues. The 
study showed that the investment risk increases due to costly sanctions against the 
company as a result of adverse regulatory and judicial findings against the company. 
The possibility of such actions against the company leads institutional investors to 
revise their perceptions of the future financial success of the company. Thus in terms 
of efficient market theory, an investment in a company that is considered 
irresponsible could be considered inefficient (Spicer, 1978), as given the choice of 
investing between two similar company where one is socially responsible and the 
other one not, with the former the investor has the ability of achieving the same 
return with less risk (Graves & Waddock, 1994). 
To measure CSP, the Graves and Waddock (1994) study generated an index from 
The Kinder Lydenberg Domini & Co. (KLD)6 database, which gave them a single 
numeral value for CSP for each of the companies in the study. The advantage of 
using KLD to measure CSP is that the companies are rated on multiple features 
which are considered important to CSP. The CSP measure used was an aggregate 
of eight different attributes of CSP, which included community relations, product 
safety, the treatment of women and minority groups, environmental issues 
management and others.  
Using a sample of 430 USA companies from the Standard & Poor's 500 in 1991 and 
treating institutional shareholders as a single group, the study found a significant 
positive relationship between CSP and the number of institutions investors holding 
the shares of the companies, and a positive but insignificant relationship between 
CSP and the percentage of shares held by institutional investors. 
The results of the study could not find support for the theoretical predictions of the 
myopic institutions theory, and showed that there were no penalties for improved 
corporate social performance in terms of institutional shareholding as predicted by 
this theory. Another interesting aspect of their findings was that there was a low 
correlation between the two measures of institutional ownership, namely the number 
6 KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. is an US company specialising in CSR ratings. 
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of institutional investors holding shares in a company, and the percentage of a 
company’s shares held by institutions. This indicated that an increase in the number 
of institutional investors holding a company’s shares did not necessarily lead to an 
increase in the number of shares held by institutional investors (Graves & Waddock, 
1994). 
Mahoney and Roberts’ (2007) study investigated the relationship between CSP and 
institutional shareholding (again represented as a single group) plus the relationship 
between CSP and company’s financial performance, on a sample of publicly held 
Canadian companies. The study makes two important contributions to the research 
of the relationship between CSP and institutional shareholding. Not only was the 
research done in a different country to the US, but it also examined the relationship  
between the two variables over a longer period of time, in contrast to the studies of 
Coffey and Fryxell (1991) and Graves and Waddock (1994), which were both based 
on single year observations. With the use of four years of data this meant the results 
of the study could be regarded as being more reliable.   
Similar to the studies done by Coffey and Fryxell (1991) and Graves and Waddock 
(1994), the CSP rating used in the Mahoney and Roberts (2007) study used both a 
composite measure of CSP and unique individual components of the overall CSP 
rating. This allowed the researchers to only test for the relationship between 
institutional shareholding against the composite measures of CSP, but also against 
individual CSP components, namely environmental issues, community relations, 
employee relations, product safety, business practices.  
Using a sample of 300 companies from then Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 300 
Index for the period of 1996 to 1999, the study found a statistically significant 
relationship between a company’s composite measure of CSP and the number of 
institutional investors holding the company’s shares, supporting the previous studies 
by Coffey and Fryxell (1991) and Graves and Waddock (1994). Similar to the result 
of the Graves and Waddock (1994), the study found an insignificant relationship 
between social performance and the percentage of shares held by institutional 
investors. On the individual components of CSP the study found a significant positive 
relationship between company’s CSP ratings regarding community relations and 
product safety and the number of institutional investors holding the company’s 
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shares, but no statistically significant relationships for the others, except for 
environmental issues. The study found a negative relationship between the number 
of institutional investors holding the company’s shares, and environmental based 
CSP. However, this relationship was not strong. 
According to Faller et al. (2016), the majority of the studies with positive results on 
the relationship between CSP and institutional shareholding applied similar variables 
to define and measure CSP, and most importantly a number of them made no 
distinction between long-term and short-term institutional shareholders. In contrast, 
the various studies which reached inconclusive results compared two different types 
of institutional investors. It is argued that it is important to make the distinction 
between the two types of institutional shareholders, as the investors often display 
different investment behaviours and strategies and apply different pressures on the 
companies they are invested in (Faller et al., 2016). This argument is based on the 
assumption that long-term institutional shareholders are more likely to support CSR 
investments compared to short-term institutional shareholders.  
Cox et al’s.(2004) research study, based on portfolio theory and using 541 UK 
companies on the FTSE All Share index between the years 2001 and 2002 as 
sample, offered new insights onto the relationship between CSP and institutional 
shareholding. With the availability of detailed institutional shareholding data, the 
study was able to classify pension funds, charity organisations and life insurance 
funds as long-term institutional investors, and investment trusts (known as exchange 
traded funds or EFTs in South Africa), and unit trusts as short-term institutional 
investors. The theoretical argument put forward by these researchers was that the 
importance of CSP in the investment decisions of the different institutional investors 
were likely to be dictated by a scope of factors, such as the financial benefits 
associated with CSP, the risk attached to CSP, and lastly the expected period over 
which the financial returns are likely to accrue. As discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter, short-term institutional shareholders in their investment decision are 
expected to respond negatively to CSP, as the pay-off from CSP is long-term, whilst 
these investors are looking for short-term financial returns (Johnson & Greening, 
1999). Long-term institutional shareholders, on the other hand, are expected to 
respond positively to good CSP, and hence a positive relationship between long-
term institutional shareholders and CSP was expected. 
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To measure the company’s CSP the study used data provided by Ethical Investment 
Research Service (EIRIS), one of the U.K.’s long standing independent CSP 
research companies. The data consisted of a composite measure of CSP and three 
components of CSP (environmental, employment relations and community 
involvement issues). Institutional shareholding was represented by the percentage of 
outstanding shares held by institutional investors. To measure the relationship 
between company’s composite CSP and institutional shareholding, institutional 
investors were divided into institutional investors identified as long-term investors, 
and shorter-term institutional investors. Additionally, five subsamples, each 
consisting of one of the five identified institutional shareholders were separately 
assessed in this study. The use of data from a credible CSP rating agency such as 
EIRIS and the availability of detailed institutional shareholding data meant that this 
study could produce more reliable results compared to Coffey and Fryxell (1991) and 
Graves and Waddock (1994) studies. The additional detailed data on institutional 
shareholding also introduced new insights into the relationship between institutional 
shareholding and CSP. 
The study found a positive significant relationship between the composite measure 
of CSP and the long-term institutional shareholders, again confirming earlier findings 
by Graves and Waddock (1994). The positive relationship was also established for 
two of the three identified long-term institutional investors, namely pension and life 
insurance funds. The study could not establish a relationship between short-term 
institutional investors as a group, but did establish a negative relationship between 
CSP and exchange traded funds. When it came to the components of CSP, the 
relationship between the components of CSP and long-term institutional 
shareholding was also found to be positive, supporting earlier research findings by 
Coffey and Fryxell (1991). No relationship could be established for short-term 
institutional investors. 
Having separated the institutional investors into two distinct groups, the positive 
relationship found between long-term institutional shareholders and CSP and the 
negative relationship established for some of the identified short-term institutional 
investors provides additional evidence to support the research findings by Johnson 
and Greening (1999), which looked at shareholder activism by institutional investors 
in 252 companies in the US in 1993. The latter study found that long-term pension 
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funds had developed into one of most active shareholders trying to force 
management to align the company’s financial interests and the interests of all 
stakeholders. Additionally, pension funds (unlike mutual funds) seemed to be 
concerned not only about the financial performance of a company, but about the 
environmental and social issues affecting the company. 
The next section will consider the empirical findings on the relationship between CSP 
and institutional shareholding from the emerging markets. 
2.4 Emerging market research studies on the potential relationship between 
CSP and institutional shareholding 
Baskin and Gordon (2005) research paper on corporate responsibility practices of 
Emerging Market companies compared 127 publicly listed companies from 21 
emerging markets against 1 740 listed companies from OECD countries. The 
countries covered included Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
others, and in totality the featured companies accounted for 22 percent of the 
emerging market companies listed on FTSE’s All-World index. The research study 
showed that over two-thirds of the featured companies from emerging market 
companies either produced a standalone sustainability report, or that their website or 
their annual report had a specific section which covered corporate responsibility. The 
study also showed that over 50% of the featured emerging market companies had 
disclosure of their environmental policies and management systems. 
Additionally Siddy (2009) points out there is measurable growth being observed in 
the sustainable investment financial sector driven by institutional investors, with over 
170 pension funds with a total combined value of funds under management at 
around US$18 trillion having now signed on as signatories to the United Nations 
Principles of Responsible Investment (UN PRI)7. The pace of change and innovation 
is particularly noticeable in emerging markets such as South Africa, Brazil, and India 
(Siddy, 2009). 
7 The UN PRI is an international organization whose role is to help signatories put into practice the six 
voluntary Principles of Responsible Investment. 
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With the current research on sustainability reporting by emerging market companies 
showing a positive upward trend, plus the growing interest into sustainability issues 
by institutional investors from emerging economies, this section discusses research 
studies from the emerging markets which have investigated the relationship between 
CSP and institutional shareholding. The majority of the research studies discussed 
below have shown a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and 
CSP, and hence the research outcomes from these studies are very similar to the 
research findings from developed nations, and follow similar research methods.  All 
the research studies treated the institutional investors as a single group and no 
difference was made between short-term and long-term institutional shareholders, 
mostly due to a lack of detailed institutional shareholding data. 
The first research study to be discussed looked at the relationship between CSP and 
Institutional shareholding for 324 Indonesian companies listed on the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange (JSX) in 2005 (Fauzi et al., 2007). When the research study was 
conducted, the country had just passed a new law referred to in the paper as 
Indonesian Law No.40. The law compelled all the companies in the country to 
consider CSR issues in their operational decision, but the majority of the Indonesian 
companies denounced the new law, claiming that it would lead to a decrease in their 
profits, and therefore were reluctant to implement it (Fauzi et al., 2007). 
The study used the number of institutional investors owning shares in a company to 
measure institutional shareholding, and applied content analysis of CSR issues 
disclosed in the annual financial reports to measure the company’s CSP. However, 
the study could not find a significant relationship between CSP and institutional 
shareholding for Indonesian companies. The reason for the lack of relationship, 
according to the researchers, was because of the attitude Indonesian firms had 
towards CSR, which they viewed only as charitable activities. CSR issues such as 
ensuring that the company maintains good corporate governance and has good 
relations with suppliers and employers were not associated with CSP by a majority of 
Indonesian companies. The shortcoming of this study was the fact that only one year 
of data was used, similar to the Coffey and Fryxell (1991) and Graves and Waddock 
(1994) studies. The other shortcoming of the study was that due to a lack of CSP 
data the researchers used self-administered content analysis to measure CSP, 
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instead of using independently compiled data from a reputable CSP ratings 
institution. 
Using self-administered content analysis CSP ratings referred to as Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) ratings, where the level of CSR disclosure in the 
company’s annual financial reports is used as proxy to measure the company’s CSP, 
Saleh et al. (2010) investigated the relationship between institutional shareholding 
and CSP in Malaysian context, using 200 Malaysian publically listed companies 
between 2000 and 2005 as sample. The study used both the percentage 
shareholding by institutional investors and the number of institutional shareholders 
holding shares of the company to measure the level of institutional ownerships, and 
a composite measure of CSP and four components that make up the overall CSP as 
dependant variables. Just like the study by Mahoney et al. (2007), the components 
included the community activities based CSP, product safety CSP, environmental 
based CSP, and employee relations CSP. 
The study found a positive relationship between the composite measure of CSP and 
institutional shareholding, supporting the results of Mahoney et al. (2007) and Cox et 
al. (2004), and the hypothesis that institutional investors in Malaysia do have a 
preference for companies that have good CSP. The results for the components of 
CSP revealed that there is positive relationship between institutional shareholding 
and product safety CSP and employee relations CSP, in accordance with the 
findings of Cox et al. (2004). However, the remaining two components (community 
activities based CSP and environmental issues CSP), showed a negative 
relationship with institutional shareholding, the latter being in line with the findings of 
Mahoney et al. (2007). An observation from the research study which could explain 
the results is that the researchers had acknowledged that most disclosed CSR 
issues in the annual reports assessed related to employee relations, and that 
environmental issues were the least disclosed. 
The other reason proposed by the researchers for the negative relationship is that 
there are usually large sums of money required for both community activities and for 
environmental issues, which could affect short-term profits.  The study theorised that 
some of the institutional shareholders (particularly short-term investors like mutual 
funds) may view these activities in a negative light, considering that these 
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institutional investors are mainly concerned with maximising returns in the short-
term. The shortcomings of the study were similar to the ones from the Fauzi et al. 
(2007) research study, as both studies used content analysis (a method subject to 
human error) to measure CSP. The other issue with the study is the fact that it only 
focused on annual financial reports, and none of the other forms of sustainability 
reporting like company websites and standalone sustainability reports were 
considered. 
Further Malaysian research studies to look into the CSP-institutional shareholder 
relationship were conducted by Hoq et al. (2010) and Muniandy and Barnes (2010). 
Hoq et al. (2010) applied exactly the same method as Saleh et al. (2010) to measure 
both CSP and institutional shareholding, except that the period covered by study was 
one year longer.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the positive relationship between 
institutional shareholding and the composite measure of CSP was similar to the 
findings by Saleh et al. (2010).   
Similarly, Muniandy and Barnes (2010) also used content analysis of CSP 
disclosures to measure a company’s CSP.  Unlike Hoq et al. (2010) and Saleh et al. 
(2010) the researchers also considered standalone CSR disclosure reports in the 
measurement of CSP, but only covered the top 100 listed Malaysian companies by 
market capitalisation. Looking at the annual reports of companies in the year 2004, 
the study found no relationship between CSP and institutional shareholding. The 
main shortcoming of this study is that only a single year of data was considered.  
Admittedly CSP data is scarce in emerging markets, but it is unlikely that one year 
worth of observations and a reduced number of companies, could reliably capture 
the relationship between institutional shareholding and CSP. 
Lastly on the discussion of the research studies from the emerging markets, the 
empirical findings from the research study conducted by Wahba (2008) into the 
relationship between environmental based CSP and institutional shareholding for 
Egyptian companies is discussed next.  
On the realisation that Egyptian companies were not advanced when it comes to 
disclosure regarding environmental issues, this researcher was compelled to look for 
innovative proxies to measure companies’ environmental based CSP. The study 
made use of a company’s adoption of an international environmental standard to 
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measure its environmental responsibility. For 156 public listed companies covering 
19 industrial sectors in 2006, the study made use of ISO 140018 certification to 
measure a company’s environmental responsibility. Data was retrieved from the 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency and companies that were certified were 
deemed environmentally responsible, and those that were not were regarded as not 
being responsible. The ISO 14001 standard was chosen because, regardless of the 
company’s size or industry type, the method to identify whether a company was 
compliant or not is the same. 
The value add of the study on CSR research was that Wahba (2008) hypothesised 
that the relationship between CSP and institutional shareholding is not static, but is 
actually affected by financial performance. The study predicted that the relationship 
between CSP and institutional shareholding is moderated and varies with the degree 
of financial performance, as institutional investors still regard the financial 
performance of the company as the main priority when making investment decisions. 
The premise is based on the empirical findings by a majority of the studies on the 
chosen topic, that have shown that when used as a control variable an improvement 
in financial performance is associated with an increase in institutional shareholding9. 
Institutional shareholding was measured using the percentage shareholding by 
institutional shareholders and financial performance was represented by return on 
assets (ROA). The study was able to confirm that there is significant positive 
relationship between Environmental based CSP and Institutional shareholding. 
In order to test for the main hypothesis, the study split the institutional shareholders 
into two financial performance groups, one classified as high performance and the 
other low performance. The researchers were able to confirm that the relationship 
between environmental based CSP and institutional shareholding was positive and 
statistically significant for the high performing group, but statistically insignificant for 
the low performance group. These findings confirm the previous findings of the 
research studies already discussed above (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Cox et al., 
8 ISO 14001 is an international standard on environmental management issued by the  International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) to help companies all over the world to manage their 
environmental responsibilities (ISO, 2017) 
9 See, for example, Coffey and Fryxell (1991); Graves and Waddock (1994); Healy et al. (1999); 
Bushee and Noe (2000); Cox et al. (2004), and Mahoney and Roberts (2007). 
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2004), where financial performance was used as control variable, and was found to 
be significant related to institutional shareholding. This implies that as much as 
institutional investor have started showing interest in ESG  issues and began to take 
them into account  when making investment decisions (Graves & Waddock, 1994; 
Mahoney et al., 2007), the financial performance of the company still remains the 
priority for the majority of institutional investors. 
The shortcoming of this research study was the fact that the data used was only 
measured for one year and the method used to measure CSP was a binary variable. 
The use of a binary variable does not account for the complexities of the many 
factors that have to be taken into account when measuring the CSR activities of a 
company. 
2.5 Institutional shareholders investment views and CSP 
To understand why this positive relationship between CSP and institutional 
shareholding exists, Petersen and Vredenburg (2009) conducted a case study on 
nine oil and gas companies in Canada who viewed themselves as socially 
responsible. In total the case study involved interviews with executives from nine 
companies and nine of their largest institutional investors. The aim of the study was 
to find out whether and why institutional investors chose to invest more in companies 
with better CSP, and what impact the different forms of CSP have on the investment 
decisions of institutional investors. 
By comparing the responses received from the institutional investors and the 
statements of managers, the study found that institutional investors often invest in 
companies who engage in CSR because they view good CSP to be a proxy for 
ethical and trustworthy management, and felt that it also represents good corporate 
governance. For the institutional investors, investing in companies with good CSP 
meant protected growth of future financial returns, implying a reduced investment 
risk. The results of this study supported the view that institutional investors mostly 
invest in high CSP companies for pragmatic (i.e. risk-return) reasons, rather than on 
moral considerations. 
The behaviour of short-term institutional investors who, unlike long-term institutional 
investors, seem to be not largely unconcerned with CSR issues when making 
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investment decisions, is illustrated by the findings of the survey study conducted by 
Teoh and Shiu (1990) on 38 Australian investment institutions. Using responses 
received to a pre-tested questionnaire from financial analysts, investment managers 
and directors of the different financial institutions, the aim of the study was to assess 
the attitudes of institutional investors towards CSR, and whether there any 
considerations of CSR issue in their investment decisions.  
The study found that the majority of the institutional investors surveyed were not 
against CSR but did not take CSR issues into account when making investment 
decisions. According to the study, institutional investors felt that most of the CSR 
disclosure at the time were mostly qualitative statements, and if the information on 
the CSR activities of the company was presented in quantifiable financial form and 
focused on product improvement, they were more likely to regard it as important and 
incorporate it into their investment decisions. 
Recognising that a majority of the institutional investors in South Africa have long-
term investment horizons like the rest of the world, De Jongh et al. (2007) conducted 
a survey study on the state of responsible investments in South Africa. This 2007 
survey interviewed 32 principal officers, 19 Chief Investment Officers and 11 Chief 
Operating Officers from different financial institutions in South Africa. Amongst other 
things, the study was conducted to find out what role ESG issues played in the 
investment decisions taken by the institutional investors. The study reported that the 
majority of the institutional investors that were interviewed indicated that, although 
ESG issue were somewhat important, they did not invest in companies based on 
their ESG performance. Furthermore, the majority of these institutional investors 
viewed responsible investments as producing inferior returns.  
Viviers (2007) attributes this behaviour and attitude towards SRI by institutional 
investors to a lack of skills by the investment professionals employed by the different 
institutional firms.  She further claims that the investment professionals are not able 
to factor in ESG issues in their investment analysis as they fail to understand the 
long-term implications of such issues on the future financial performance of the 
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company, and that this problem is not only unique to South Africa, but seems to be 
one be one of the main constrains to the growth of SRI worldwide.  
Additionally, Herringer et al. (2009) points out South African currently lacks rigorous, 
credible research to refute the belief by the majority of the institutional investors that 
the financial returns on SRI are lower compared to conventional investments.  
2.6 Conclusion and Hypotheses 
Even though there are research studies which have shown that not all institutional 
investors consider CSR issues when making investment decisions (see, for example, 
Teoh and Shiu, 1990; De Jongh et al., 2007), a reflection of above, the majority of the 
empirical research findings covered above seem to support the idea that there is 
strong positive relationship between a company’s CSP and the percentage or number 
of institutional investors invested in it (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Mahoney & Roberts, 
2007; Wahba, 2008; Saleh et al., 2010). The positive findings also seem to support 
the theoretical predictions of portfolio theory, with studies such as those of Wahba 
(2008) and Petersen and Vredenburg (2009) showing that there is possibility that the 
positive relationship between institutional shareholding and CSP is mainly driven by 
financial reasons from the perspective of the institutional investors, who possibly only 
invest in high-CSP companies simply because they view them as representing a lower 
investment risk. The current research study therefore hypothesises that: 
H1: There is positive relationship between CSP and institutional shareholding for 
JSE-listed companies 
H2: There is positive relationship between the environmental based CSP and 
institutional shareholding for JSE-listed companies 
H3: There is positive relationship between the social based CSP and institutional 
shareholding for JSE-listed companies 
H4: There is positive relationship between the governance based CSP and 
institutional shareholding for JSE-listed companies 
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CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This Chapter discusses the sample and data used in the current research study, and 
additionally provides details on the regression methodologies applied, and the tests 
performed on the regression data.   
3.1 Sample and Data 
The following section details the process that was undertaken in the collection of the 
data used in the study. 
The most critical information required to conduct the study was CSP and institutional 
shareholding data. The initial data population of the study comprised of all the 
companies included in the FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index (ALSI)10 at any time 
between the years 2009 and 2015, and consisted of 237 companies. The use of the 
FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index was to ensure that the sample represents the bulk 
of the JSE by market capitalisation. This approach was different to the majority of the 
previous studies, which used methods such as choosing the Top 100 companies to 
study the relationship. In addition, listed companies not included in the ALSI 
generally suffer from liquidity and data problems. 
The year 2009 was chosen because that is when Bloomberg started publishing ESG 
disclosure scores, which are used in this study as a proxy of CSP. Bloomberg 
produces four aggregated disclosure scores that aim to measure a company’s level 
of ESG disclosure to the general public (Bloomberg, 2017a; Mueller, 2014). The first 
one is the Environmental Disclosure Score, followed by the Social Disclosure Score, 
the Governance Disclosure Score, and lastly the overall ESG Disclosure Score, with 
the latter measuring the overall degree of transparency across all environmental, 
social, and governance metrics (Mueller, 2014). The scores are based on a wide 
variety of detailed ESG data points collected by Bloomberg from the company’s 
integrated financial statements, sustainability reports and company websites. 
According to Eccles et al. (2011), who conducted a study on the market interest in 
non-financial information based on Bloomberg ESG Disclosure scores, Bloomberg 
10 The FTSE/JSE Africa All Shares Index is a ‘market capitalization-weighted index. Companies 
included in this index make up the top 99% of the all listed companies on the JSE’ (Bloomberg, 2017b) 
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has one of the most comprehensive metrics used to compute ESG disclosure 
scores. Using the raw data provided directly by Bloomberg, Eccles et al. (2011) 
explains that Bloomberg uses 121 environmental metrics, 35 social metrics, and 17 
Governance metrics to generate its scores. For each of the four groups of scores a 
range from 0.1 to 100 is used to rate the disclosure level for each of the companies 
based on The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines11 .  
Table 1 below provides an overview of the data themes covered by the Bloomberg 
ESG disclosure ratings. 
Table 1 ESG Data Themes 
Environmental Disclosure Social Disclosure Governance Disclosure 
Environmental fines Fair remuneration policy Number of independent Directors 
Carbon emissions 
Percentage of Woman in 
management 
Percentage of independent Directors 
Water usage Work force diversity Board meeting attendance percentage 
Hazardous waste produced Employee fatalities Political donations 
Wastes disposal management Equal opportunity policy Size of the board 
Energy consumption Community spending Board meeting duration 
Climate change policies 
Employee turnover 
percentage 
Number of board meetings in a year 
  Source: Bloomberg (2017a) 
Each data point in the metrics is weighted in terms of importance and this makes it 
possible to assigned higher weights to the more relevant disclosures. The scores are 
also designed in a way that caters for the different industries in the market (Eccles et 
al., 2011). This ensures that each company is evaluated in terms of reporting data 
that is relevant to its respective industry, making the scores sophisticated enough to 
be comparable between industries. The final assigned score is determined by the 
degree of transparency of a company’s reporting, measured in terms of how many of 
the measured metrics a company is reporting (Eccles et al., 2011; Mueller, 2014), 
with the company that discloses the most relevant information receiving the highest 
score, and the one that discloses the least relevant information scoring the lowest.  
11 The GRI is an international standards organization that assists different corporations around the world 
to understand and communicate their impact on ESG issues (Global Reporting Initiative, 2017) 
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The shareholding data used in this study was extracted from the Bloomberg terminal 
for the period 2010 to 2016. The institutional shareholding data reported by 
Bloomberg is supplied by Strate, South Africa's Central Securities Depository 
Company. Bloomberg classifies institutional investors into eight categories, as shown 
in Table 2 below. All other shareholders are considered to be non-institutional.  
Table 2 Bloomberg institutional shareholder classification 
Hedge Fund Managers Insurance Companies 
Private Equity Public Retirement Funds 
Banks Investment Advisors 
Mutual Funds Pension Funds 
Lastly, the accounting data used in this study regarding the company’s financial 
performance was extracted from INET BFA. INET BFA was chosen due to the 
simplicity of presentation of the information. Although two different data sources were 
used in this study, only one source was used for any specific data element, and so 
the use of different data suppliers is not considered an issue.     
The research question predicts that institutional investors are likely to invest more in 
companies with higher CSP ratings. Following the method applied in previous 
research studies on the relationship between CSP and institutional shareholding, a 
lag of one year between institutional ownership data and all independent variables 
was assumed (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Cox et al., 2004; Mahoney & Robert, 
2007). Therefore, data for the independent and control variables used in the 
regressions was gathered from 2009 to 2015, whereas shareholding data was 
collected over the 2010 to 2016 period.  
Missing ESG data reduced the sample of firms from 237 to 149 companies, and 
incomplete ESG data further reduced the sample of companies to 98 companies, 
with 532 combined observations between the years 2009 and 2016. The majority of 
the companies which did not have ESG data were listed property companies. 
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Additionally the researcher noticed anomalies in the reported shareholding data 
between the period of 2010 and 2013. Specifically, in the year 2013 there was a 
sudden sharp increase in both the percentage of shares held by institutional 
shareholders, as well as the number of institutional investors holding the shares of 
the respective companies, as reported by Bloomberg. Questions were sent to 
Bloomberg to clarify some of the observed anomalies. It became evident from the 
Bloomberg responses that the data for the period of 2010 to 2013 could not be 
considered credible due to Strate supplying incomplete shareholding data to 
Bloomberg. The main cause behind the incomplete data was that, before the 
introduction of the Protection of Private Information Act (POPI) by the end of 2013 by 
the South African government, there were some privacy concerns raised by some of 
the institutional shareholders which resulted in the incomplete institutional 
shareholding information being reported by Bloomberg for those years. The 
researcher decided that the data in this period should be removed from the final 
sample, which had the effect of substantially reducing the sample size from 532 
observations to 254 observations, with the number of companies remaining at 98. 
This final sample is comparable to Wahba (2008) study discussed above which had 
156 companies’ and 435 observations. A summarized description of the process it 
took to arrive at the final sample of companies is provided in Table 3 below  





Number of companies in the original sample 237 761 
Sampled reduced by : 
ESG Bloomberg disclosure scores not published (88) (0) 
ESG Bloomberg disclosure scores incomplete (51) (229) 
Subtotal 98 532 
Incomplete institutional shareholding data (0) (278) 
Final sample 98 254 
The demographics of the final data sample are also provided below in Table 4. The 
data is summarised in terms of size. An observation can be made that the final 
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sample largely consist of medium size companies, showing a good range of the 
companies featured in the FTSE/JSE Africa All Shares Index. 
Table 4 Sample by company size 
Index Number of Companies 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 29 
FTSE/JSE Mid Cap 44 
FTSE/JSE Small Cap 25 
Total Sample 98 
3.2 Methodology 
The following section is a detailed discussion of the measurement of different 
variables used in the study. It is divided into three main variables, namely dependent 
variables, independent variables, and control variables. 
3.2.1 Regression variables 
Dependant Variable – Institutional Shareholding: 
Consistent with prior research on the topic (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Mahoney & 
Robert, 2007), Institutional shareholding is represented in two ways, namely by the 
percentage of ordinary shares owned by institutional investors, and by the number of 
institutional investors owning shares in each company.  
To extract the data from Bloomberg the sampled companies were first sorted by their 
financial year end. The aim was to collect shareholding data two months after the 
financial year end for each of the companies. The period of two months is meant to 
coincide with when the annual financial statements (which include the ESG reports) 
are published. This is meant to capture the investment decision of institutional 
investors between the periods when the annual financial statements are published, 
and when the investment decision is made. The study assumes that the investment 
decision by the institutional investor is based on the historical CSP by that particular 
company (Mahoney & Robert, 2007; Fauzi et al., 2007). 
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Independent Dependant Variable - CSP and its components: 
The key independent variable in this study is Corporate Social Performance (CSP). 
Previous studies on CSR research have used various proxies to measure CSP - 
examples include Graves and Waddock (1994) and others who used KLD ratings to 
measure CSP for North-American companies, while Mahoney and Robert (2007) 
used Jantzi Research Associates Inc (JRI) ratings for Canadian companies. Cox et 
al. (2004) used data developed by EIRiS to measure CSP for UK companies and 
Hoq et al. (2010) and Saleh et al. (2010) used self-administered CSP ratings referred 
to as Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) ratings for Malaysian 
companies.  
The CSP data for this research was drawn from Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores, 
which is one of the very few sources of CSP data for listed South African companies. 
As far the author is aware, this is the first study to use Bloomberg ESG disclosure 
ratings to study the relationship between institutional shareholding and CSP.  
It is important to note that generally ESG disclosure ratings are not the same as 
CSP, but rather indicate the level to which a company is reporting on ESG data 
(Eccles et al., 2011). This means that the current data set does not allow for 
companies with poor CSP to be identified.  This then creates the possibility that a 
company in this data set could have a good disclosure score, but not necessary 
have good actual CSP. Clarkson et al.(2008) argues that although this is a 
possibility, companies with superior CSP tend to convey their ‘‘type’’ by pointing to 
verifiable CSP indicators in their disclosure reports, which they deem to be difficult to 
copy by inferior type of companies (Clarkson et al., 2008, p. 304). Inferior 
performers, on the other hand, will choose to disclose less or be ‘‘silent’’ on their 
CSP,  and will focus on disclosing more of the unverifiable acts of their CSP, which 
then makes it possible for investors and other stakeholders  to identify these 
companies as the  ‘‘average type’’(Clarkson et al., 2008, p. 304). In a market where 
financial resources are scarce and institutional shareholders have limited funds to 
invest, good corporate citizens must find a way to make sure they are chosen.  
Additionally, the proposition that increased ESG disclosure is related to increase 
CSP performance is supported by the research results of a study by Al-Tuwaijri et al. 
(2004). This research study, conducted on an earlier sample of 198 US companies in 
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the year 1994 on the relationship between environmental disclosures, environmental 
performance and financial performance, found that not only is good environmental 
performance significantly associated with good financial performance, but it is also 
significantly associated with more extensive quantifiable environmental disclosures 
by the companies with good environmental performance. 
Following from the previous studies on the research topic (Saleh et al., 2010; Cox et 
al., 2004; Mahoney & Robert, 2007), the present study also disaggregates the 
composite CSP rating into three sub-components, namely environmental 
performance, social performance and governance performance (i.e. the so-called 
ESG components). The rationale behind this approach is proposed by Griffin and 
Mahon (1997), who suggested that CSP measurement should be disaggregated into 
its individual components to avoid the loss of critical information as a result of 
combing the different components into a single composite measure of CSP. 
Therefore, the disaggregation provides the research study with the additional ability 
to assess which of the different forms of CSP is/are the key driver(s) of the 
relationship between CSP and institutional shareholding. 
Although this is the first study to make use of Bloomberg ESG disclosure ratings to 
test the relationship between institutional shareholding and CSP, it is still possible to 
compare the results of the current study to the previous studies done on the 
research topic. This is made possible by the fact that the current study takes into 
account and measures the majority of the CSP topics covered in the previous 
studies. For example studies done by Graves and Waddock (1994) and Johnson and 
Greening (1999), which employ KLD ratings to measure CSP, describe CSP as a 
component of environmental, community, human rights, employee relations, diversity 
and customer’s performance issues. Even in those instances where emerging 
market research studies by Hoq et al. (2010) and Saleh et al. (2010), using 
Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) ratings as a proxy for CSP for 
Malaysian companies, define CSP as a combination of environmental, employee 
relations, community involvement and product safety issues.  
Issues such as community, human rights, employee relations, diversity, customers 
and product safety, are now covered under the social performance component in the 
ESG disclosure ratings (Dorfleitner et al., 2015). One major difference is that when 
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Bloomberg ESG disclosure ratings are used to measure CSP, there is also an 
emphasis on governance, which was not present in previous studies.  
Thus, the prominent studies which have been done on the research topic did not 
measure governance as a component of CSP. This is one of the shortcomings 
identified by Dorfleitner et al. (2015) with regards to KLD ratings, in the study that 
compared some of the most important sustainability rating providers in the world, 
specifically looking at CSP ratings by ASSET4 by Thomson Reuters, KLD and 
Bloomberg. This comparison highlighted that not only are the KLD ratings focused 
on American companies, but that the KLD rating system seems to produce the least 
amount of information when it comes to measuring governance disclosures.  
The use of Bloomberg ESG disclosure ratings, which include the governance 
element as a measure of CSP, is important for several reasons. Firstly, the use of 
Bloomberg ESG disclosure ratings has brought a comprehensive amount of the 
social issues covered by the previous method in the measurement of CSP into a 
simple rating method. Eccles et al. (2011) identified that one of the main barriers to 
the widespread acceptance and use of non-financial information by the different 
investors and other related stakeholders is the lack of generally accepted reporting 
standards and information framework. 
Secondly, Eccles et al. (2011) observed that the overall interest by the different 
investors was more in environmental and governance performance information than 
it was on social performance information. It was suggested than the stronger interest 
in environmental information than social issues could be attributed to the fact that the 
majority of the environmental effects are simpler to quantify and to integrate into 
valuation models, whilst the interest in corporate governance can be explained by 
the large amount of literature and research findings on the impact of governance on 
corporate financial performance and financial risk.  
An example of this are the findings of the 2009 report compiled by The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which analysed the impact of 
the failures and weaknesses of corporate governance on the 2008 financial crisis, 
with a special focus on risk management systems and executive salaries companies 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009). The report found that the financial crisis can be to a significant 
extent be attributed to the failures and weakness in corporate governance systems, 
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which did not serve their intended purposes, which are to safeguard against 
excessive risk taking place in a significant number of financial services companies 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
Lastly, the use of Bloomberg ESG disclosure ratings bring additional credibility on 
the CSR research topic. Bloomberg ESG disclosure ratings are used by a large 
numbers of investors and related stakeholders. Bloomberg reported that in the year 
2016, 12 242 unique users made use of the Bloomberg ESG data, with the number 
having grown from 5 172 users in 2012 (Bloomberg, 2016). 
 Control variables:
The accounting data used for the financial control variables was extracted from INET 
BFA terminal for the years 2013 to 2015.  Following the previous research studies on 
the relationship between CSP and institutional shareholding (Graves & Waddock, 
1994; Cox et al., 2004; Mahoney & Robert, 2007; Fauzi et al., 2007; Hoq et al., 
2010), the control variables used in the study include financial performance, 
company size, leverage, and industry classification.  
The study controls for the financial performance of the companies because the 
accounting profits which a company generates are expected to be very influential in 
the market valuation of the company by institutional investors (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999). Return on assets and return on equity are both used as a proxy for 
financial performance (Mahoney & Robert, 2007; Hoq et al., 2010). Return on assets 
is measured as profits before interest and tax, divided by total assets. Return on 
equity is measured as the ratio of taxed profits attributable to ordinary shareholders, 
divided by the ordinary shareholders’ funds 
The study also controls for the size of the company based on the research findings 
by Elyasiani and Jia (2010) which showed that Institutional investors have a 
preference in investing in larger well established companies. The research study was 
investigating the relationship between company’s performance and the level and 
stability of institutional shareholding for US companies between the years 1992 to 
2004. Graves and Waddock (1994) has also theorised that some institutional 
investors prefer to invest in smaller companies as their investment holdings are likely 
to be significant, which will allow them to able to influence decisions taken by the 
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management of the company. In the current research study company size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets (Graves & Waddock, 1994). 
The study makes used of logged values in order to minimize the impact of extreme 
numbers and to achieve normality of the variable. 
The company’s leverage was included as a control variable based on the research 
findings by Tong and Ning (2004). When looking at whether the capital structure of a 
company affects its institutional shareholding for US S&P 500 companies over 1997–
2001 period. The study found that company’s debt ratio is negatively related to the 
number of institutional investors. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) argues that the 
high risk of insolvency often associated with the more indebted companies is likely to 
discourage some institutional investors in holding shares in that company. The 
company’s leverage in the study is measured as the ratio of total debt over total 
assets (Mahoney & Robert, 2007).  
Lastly, the study controls for the different sectors applicable to our selected sampled 
(Graves & Waddock, 1994). The sector dummy variables were created using the 
Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS), which group companies into 11 
economic groups as from the year 2016 (MSCI, 2016). The companies where 
classified according to the following GICS sectors ,Consumer, Energy, Financials, 
Health Care ,Industrials, IT, Materials, Real Estate, Telecommunication. A summary 
of the sampled companies grouped by their sector is provided Table 5 below. 
Table 5 Sample industry classification 








Real Estate 10 
Telecommunication 3 
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The next section discusses the descriptive statistics from the final sample used in the 
study. Descriptive statistics provide simple summaries about the research data and 
are used to compare the quantitative features for each of the variables in the sample. 
The descriptive statistics for this research study are reported in Table 6 and Table 7 
below. Table 6 show the descriptive statistics of original data before some of the 
variables are winsorised and logged. The reported results on Table 7 were after the 
data was winsorised and logged. 
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics 
Stats PERC_IS NUMBER_IS ROA ROE ASSETS LEVERAGE ESG Env Soc Gov 
N 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 231 244 253 
Mean 71.41 499.11 9.65 15.25 101 021.00 0.50 37.49 27.53 44.20 58.35 
Median 77.16 478.00 8.63 15.16 20 100.79 0.49 37.76 26.36 43.86 57.14 
SD 24.48 226.72 14.42 18.75 268 888.00 0.25 12.27 13.73 16.97 8.14 
Min 12.81 64.00 -75.08 -88.57 1.32 0.03 11.16 2.33 5.26 32.14 
Max 100.00 1 124.00 72.29 74.15 1 979 349.00 1.21 62.66 65.29 78.95 82.14 
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics (Winsorised and Logged) 
Stats PERC_IS NUMBER_IS ROE ROA Log ASSETS LEVERAGE ESG Env Soc Gov 
N 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 231 244 253 
Mean 71.41 499.11 9.68 16.09 9.90 0.50 37.49 27.53 44.20 58.35 
Median 77.16 478.00 8.63 15.16 9.91 0.49 37.76 26.36 43.86 57.14 
SD 24.48 226.72 10.61 13.75 1.77 0.25 12.27 13.73 16.97 8.14 
Min 12.81 64.00 -6.95 -8.70 5.47 0.03 11.16 2.33 5.26 32.14 
Max 100.00 1124.00 36.00 49.02 13.24 1.21 62.66 65.29 78.95 82.14 
An assessment of the research data as reported on Table 7 shows that on average, 
institutional shareholders owned and held about 71 percent of the ordinary shares of 
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the companies in the study.  One can observe that there is a significant variance in 
the reported institutional shareholding for each of the companies, from a low of 12.8 
percent to a maximum of 100 percent.  A look at the number of institutional investors 
holding shares in each of the companies within the researched period, shows that on 
average the number of institutions holding shares was about 478, with a minimum of 
64 and a maximum of 1124. 
The average overall Bloomberg ESG Disclosure Score for the companies in the 
study is 37.49 with a minimum score of 11.16 and maximum score of 62.66. The 
standard deviation of 12.27 shows that there is some significant variance in the 
reported scores among the different companies in the study. Table 7 further reveals 
that the recorded ESG Disclosure sub-components scores have some distinct 
differences. For instance, one can observe that the governance disclosure score is 
the most reported, showing 253 observations. These scores also show the highest 
mean at 58. The reported governance disclosure scores are also exhibit a fairly low 
variation compared to the other ESG disclosure sub-components, showing a 
standard deviation of 8.13. There seems to be low disclosure for both environmental 
and social issues by the companies in the study, with the environmental issues being 
reported the least. Environmental disclosure show a recorded minimum score of 2.3, 
and a maximum score of 65.28 from a total of 231 observations. The environmental 
disclosure figures are the lowest recorded figures among the ESG disclosure sub-
components. Additionally, the reported social disclosure scores are found to exhibit a 
fairly big variation compared to the other ESG disclosure sub-components, showing 
a standard deviation of 16.97.  
One of the contributing factors to the level of disclosure among the ESG sub-
components could be the fact that currently there are no prescribed legislative 
requirements for JSE listed companies to disclose on environmental and social 
issues. On the other hand, the disclosure on governance issues in the form of King 
Reporting12, is one of the requirements for a company’s listed on the JSE (Visser, 
2005). 
12 The King Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa was first published in 1992 by the Institute 
of Directors South Africa and revised in 2003. It encourages companies to annually disclose the nature 
and extent of its social, transformational, ethical, safety, health and environmental policies and practices 
(Institute of Directors South Africa, 2016). 
38 
Another notable observation that we can make from Table 7 is with regard to the 
control variables used in the study. Starting with the two measures of the company’s 
financial performance, ROE and ROA - both variables exhibited extreme values in 
their data set, which were classified as outliers. It has been found that in a multiple 
linear regression, the ordinary least of squares estimator is very sensitive to the 
presence of outliers in the independent variable (Jadhav & Kashid, 2014). To handle 
these problems in the data set, thereby limiting the effect of the outliers, 
winsorization of the estimators is proposed. Both ROE and ROA variables were 
therefore winsorized at the 5% level. The winsorization resulted in 13 of the 254 
observations being affected for each of the variables (see Appendix A for a graphical 
comparison of the variables before and after winsorization).  
Comparing the winsorized data in Table 7 to Table 6, one can observe that there are 
no major difference between figures for both ROE and ROA, apart from a change in 
the reported minimum and maximum figures. The standard deviation for ROE went 
from 14.42 to 10.61, and the average return on equity went from 9.65 percent to 9.68 
percent. For ROA the standard deviation moved from 18.75 to 13.75, and the 
average return on assets went from 5.25 percent to 16.09 percent. The new 
standard deviation for both variables are still fairly high and show volatility in the data 
set. This is regarded as showing a realistic representation of the distinct differences 
in the financial performance of the different companies in the studied sample. 
Looking at Table 6, showing the original data before it is transformed, one can see 
that although the average asset value for the companies in our data set was about 
R101 billion, a significant majority of the companies in the study had assets worth 
less than R50 billion, with an overall median at R20 billion. This unevenness in the 
data set caused the standard deviation for this variable to be extremely high at 
R268.9 billion. Additionally, the variable has outlying data which causes it to have a 
positively skewed distribution. Therefore, in order to achieve a normal distribution in 
the variable, a natural logarithmic transformation was applied to assets (see 
Appendix A and Table 7 for the results) (UCLA, 2017). 
Lastly, the average total debt over total assets for the companies in the sample was 
50%, and almost equal to the median figure of 49%.  
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3.4 Pearson Correlation 
This section discusses the unconditional correlation between the variables. The test 
for the association between the variables is done through the use of a Pearson 
correlation matrix, which measures the strength and direction of the linear 
relationship between the variables (UCLA, 2017). The results of the Pearson’s 
correlation matrix for this research study are reported in Table 8 below.  
 Table 8 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
PERC_IS NUMBER_IS ROE ROA Log_ASSETS LEVERAGE ESG Env Soc Gov 
PERC_IS 1 
NUMBER_IS 0.3945**** 1 
ROE 0.0083 0.0482 1 
ROA 0.1117 0.091 0.7550**** 1 
Log_ASSETS 0.0928 0.6146**** -0.1927*** -0.0838 1 
Leverage 0.1634*** 0.2062**** 0.0935 0.2185**** 0.0248 1 
ESG 0.115 0.3509**** -0.1321** -0.1898*** 0.2628**** -0.1905***  1 
Env 0.0139 0.2767**** -0.0967 -0.1774*** 0.1192 -0.1516** 0.9238**** 1 
Soc 0.1272** 0.2146**** -0.0274 -0.0947 0.1814*** -0.2177**** 0.8068**** 0.5351**** 1 
Gov 0.1273** 0.3401**** -0.1693*** -0.1830*** 0.3040**** -0.1023 0.7276**** 0.5741**** 0.5113**** 1 
Correlation significance for (2-tailed). 
p < .10 *    p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 **** 
The unconditional correlations in Table 8 above suggest that the variables in this 
study are highly correlated. There are high correlations observed over a significant 
number of the variables in the sample, but this did not result in multicollinearity 
issues in the data set. Using variance inflation factor (VIF) methodology to test for 
multicollinearity issues, it was confirmed that the models used do not suffer from 
multicollinearity. A comprehensive detail of the tests conducted for the regression 
models is provided in Section 3.5.1  
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A look at Table 8 reveals some interesting observations.  Starting with the two 
measurements of institutional shareholding, one can see that percentage 
shareholding by institutional shareholders is highly correlated with the number of 
institutional investors. This suggests that an increase in the percent of shares held 
by institutional shareholders is often accompanied by an increase in the number of 
institutional investors holding the shares of that specific company.   
Another observation is with regard to the accounting based financial performance 
indicators, ROE and ROA. From Table 8 one can see that there is no linear 
relationship between these variable with any of the measurements of institutional 
shareholding. This is unexpected, as institutional shareholders would be expected to 
pay attention to the company’s financial performance, unless they in some instances 
invest in anticipation of improved financial performance. Furthermore, the size of the 
companies in the sample does not seem to be correlated with leverage, but is highly 
correlated with the number of institutional investors.  
ESG disclosure and its sub-components are correlated with the numbers of 
institutional investors, but only two out of the four ESG disclosure scores are 
correlated with the percentage shareholding variable. The positive linear correlation 
between these variables is expected, and supports the main hypothesis of the 
current research study. Additionally, it is noticeable that the overall ESG Disclosure 
score, as well as some of its sub-components (except for social disclosure) are 
negatively correlated with the financial performance measures. This lends support to 
the view that CSP results in negative financial performance by the company (Mittal et 
al., 2008; Fisher-Vanden & Thorburn, 2011). According to Han et al. (2016) this 
negative correlation between the two variables normally occurs when companies 
who are at the early stage of engaging in socially responsible activities incur high 
operational costs related to these new ESG activities. The effect of the increase in 
their ESG scores as the result of the increase in their social responsible activities, is 
that in the short term there is a negative effect on their financial performance.  
There also seems to be a positive association between the company’s size and its 
ESG Disclosure. Lastly, leverage, on the other hand, seems to be negatively 
correlated with all ESG disclosure scores. 
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3.5 Regression assumption tests 
The next section details the approach adopted by the current research study with 
regards to the data set-up and the regression analysis method used. Specifics are 
provided regarding the statistical tests that were conducted on the regression 
analysis and further details are provided regarding the effect of the statistical test 
results. 
To answer the research question of whether there is a relationship between 
institutional shareholding and CSP, the study makes use of an unbalanced panel 
data and the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique. The data in the 
study is classified as unbalanced panel data, due to the fact that the number of time 
periods (i.e. years) in the study are not the same for all individual companies being 
studied (Baltagi, 2005). Lastly the unbalanced panel data being used in the study is 
often the norm in typical financial empirical research settings (Baltagi & Song, 2006). 
When the researcher is collecting data (for example on countries or companies over 
a period of time), it is likely that some companies started recording the data later 
than others, or that some companies have stopped recording the data altogether 
(Baltagi & Song, 2006). 
The panel data setup is chosen for a number of reasons. Panel data offers several 
advantages over cross sectional or time series data and also contains features of 
both data set-ups. With panel data you are able to achieve a more accurate 
estimation of the effect of the independent variables on the dependant variables in 
the regression analysis. This is made possible by the fact that panel data usually 
comprises of additional degrees of freedom and a greater sample variability 
compared to both cross-sectional and time-series data (Hsiao, 2007). Additionally, in 
the use of panel data helps with controlling for the individual-specific unobservable 
effects of the omitted variables in the regression model. It has been shown in the 
research literature that the real reason one may or may not find certain effects in the 
specified regression model is possibly due to one ignoring and not taking into 
account certain variables which are correlated with the stipulated independent 
variables in the model (Arellano, 2003).  
This correlation between the observed explanatory variables and the unobserved 
ones is referred to as unobserved heterogeneity, and it has been found to be a 
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pervasive problem in cross-sectional data analysis. A major driving force in use 
panel data in econometric research has been the fact it is possible for one to control 
for the possibility of correlated, time-invariant heterogeneity without actually having 
to observe it (Arellano, 2003).  
Lastly, one additional reason which is very much relevant in the current study is the 
fact that panel data makes it possible to identify complicated relationships in the data 
set, and therefore makes it easier to conduct studies involving dynamic models. 
Dynamic models are linear regression models containing lagged dependent 
variables (Hsiao, 2007). This is unlike time series data, which often forces one to rely 
on restrictive arbitrary tests to estimate the impact of the time adjustment patterns 
between current and lagged variables due the likelihood of collinearity between the 
current and lagged variables. Panel data relies on the unique characteristics of each 
of the studied subjects (companies in the current study) to reduce collinearity, and to 
make it possible to study the complex relationship between the current and lagged 
variables (Gujarati, 2003). 
Before performing the regression analysis in the study, a choice had to be made 
between the Fixed Effects and Random Effects models. According to Gardiner et al. 
(2001), the major difference between the Fixed Effects and Random Effects models 
is one of inference in the data sample. With fixed effects analysis the researcher can 
only support inference about the group of companies in the studied sample. The 
random effects analysis, on the other hand allows, the researcher to infer something 
about the overall population which the studied sample was original drawn from. 
Fixed Effects also assume that the individual-specific unobservable effects of the 
omitted variables are correlated to the independent variables in the studied sample, 
while Random Effects assume they are not. Both Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
models work to remove unobserved explanatory variables bias by measuring the 
changes within the sample group. By measuring the changes within a group across 
time, one is able to control for the individual-specific unobservable effects of the 
omitted variables in the studied sample.  
The Hausman Specification Test was used to help decide which of the two models 
should be applied in the study. The test checks whether the unique regression errors 
of individual-specific unobservable effects are correlated with those of independent 
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variables in the model, with the null hypothesis being that they are not (StataCorp, 
2013). 
Therefore the null hypothesis for the test is that the random effects must be used in 
the regression analysis and a p-value lo less than 0.05 indicates that the fixed effects 
must be applied. As shown in Figure 1 and appendix B, the Stata results of the 
Hausman test recommend that the Fixed Effects model be applied in the research 
study, as it possess the most efficient estimator of the relationship between the 
independent variable and dependant variables (StataCorp, 2013).  
Model 1 Model 2 
Figure 1 Hausman Test results (Models 1 and 2) 
The Fixed Effects Model possesses a few advantages, including that it allows the 
researcher to control for unobserved heterogeneity and additionally regression 
results based on Fixed Effects result in small standard errors, which means that the 
regression analysis is more powerful (StataCorp, 2013). 
3.5.1 OLS assumptions tests 
The next step was conducting statistical tests to confirm that none of the OLS 
assumptions have been violated in the regression analysis. The rationale behind the 
tests is that most regression techniques (including panel data methods) rely upon the 
variables used in the analysis meeting a certain number of assumptions. In 
circumstances where these assumptions are not met, the regression results may be 
considered to not be trustworthy, resulting in what is described as either Type I or 
Type II error (Osborne & Waters, 2002).  
The normal distribution of both the dependant and independent variables in the 
sample data is one of the four identified required assumptions to conduct regression 
analysis (Osborne and Waters, 2002). According to Field (2013), one can look for 
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
38.6
Prob>chi2  = 0.0000
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
38.14
Prob>chi2  = 0.0000
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normality in three ways, namely by using graphs, significance tests and/or numerical 
tests. Graphs involve the use of histograms and Q-Q plots, while numerical tests 
include the use of skewness and kurtosis measurements. Lastly, significant tests 
include the use of Shapiro-Wilk and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. 
Shapiro-Wilk is the recommended significant test method for normality as 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov is not regarded as a powerful enough method to test for 
normality (StataCorp, 2013). The Shapiro-Wilk normality test for all the variables in 
Table 9 below provides evidence to reject the null hypothesis of a normal distribution 
for all the variables except for two. 
Table 9 Shapiro- Wilk test for normality 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Variable Obs Statistic Df Z Prob>z 
PERC_IS 254 0.9443 10.2370 5.4160 0.0000 
NUMBER_IS 254 0.9815 3.4070 2.8550 0.0022 
ROE 254 0.9488 9.4160 5.2210 0.0000 
ROA 254 0.9571 7.8960 4.8110 0.0000 
Log_ASSETS 254 0.9646 6.5020 4.3590 0.0000 
LEVERAGE 254 0.9838 2.9880 2.5490 0.0054 
ESG 254 0.9836 3.0250 2.5770 0.0050 
Env 231 0.9850 2.5370 2.1580 0.0155 
Soc 244 0.9940 1.0670 0.1500 0.4405 
Gov 253 0.9968 0.5870 -1.2420 0.8929 
A numerical skewness and kurtosis test was performed, where skewness defines the 
degree and direction of asymmetry of the variable, and kurtosis measures the 
heaviness of the tails of the distribution of the variable (Hamilton, 2012).  A normal 
distribution has a skewness of zero, and the further away the skewness of a variable 
is from zero, the more likely it is to be not normally distributed. A look at the results 
from Table 10 below shows that half the variables are negatively skewed, while the 
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remaining ones are all positively skewed. One can observe that the majority of the 
variables are closer to zero and are very far from either minus or plus one (the latter 
two values being indicators of severe skewness). 
Table 10 Skewness and Kurtosis normality test 
Stats PERC_IS NUMBER_IS ROE ROA Log_ASSETS LEVERAGE ESG Env Soc Gov 
N 254 254 254 254 254 254 254 231 244 253 
Skewness -0.6904 0.3190 0.7222 0.5606 -0.4453 0.2101 -0.0967 0.2797 -0.1347 -0.0006
Kurtosis 2.3999 2.4334 3.2836 3.5160 3.6258 2.5818 2.2977 2.5800 2.5723 3.0634 
Additionally, a normal distribution has a kurtosis of three. Table 10 shows that three 
variables could be suffering from heavy tailed distributions, and the remainder from 
light tailed distributions. For all the variables the kurtosis does not seem to be 
severe, as they are not far away from a kurtosis of three. 
The significance tests for normality showed that the null hypothesis should be 
rejected for 8 out of the 10 variables, and the numerical test results report mixed 
results with regards to the skewness and kurtosis. The study then considered the 
points raised by Field (2013), who argues that with large sample sizes it is very easy 
to obtain significant results from minor deviations from normality in the data set. This 
means that a significant test is not necessarily helpful in deciding whether the 
deviations from normality by a variable is sufficient to bias the statistical technique 
one applies to the data set. To reach a well informed decision on the normality of the 
data, researchers are further advised to plot their data and interpret the significance 
tests in conjunction with graphs in the form of histograms and Q-Q plots. 
A visual inspection of data plots of the variables in Appendix C indicates that the 
independent leverage variable and the dependant percentage shareholding by 
institutional shareholders variable are the only variables that seem to suffer from 
severe non-normal data distribution, while the remainder of the variables do not 
seem to be far from normal distribution.  
Although the study by Osborne (2002), discussed above, identified the normality of 
the variables as one of the four assumption that multiple regression researchers 
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must always test to ensure they achieve trustworthy inferences in the regression 
analysis, Grajales et al. (2013) point out that the assertion by Osborne (2002) about 
the normality of the variables being one of the assumptions required to run an OLS 
regression is incorrect.  Evidence is provided in the latter study showing that the 
required assumption around normality to run an OLS regression does not pertain to 
the independent and dependent variables in the data set, but actually relates to the 
model’s regression errors, which must be normally distributed.   
Firstly Grajales et al. (2013) points out that the assumption around the normal 
distribution of regression errors is very useful because when it does hold true, the 
researcher can make trustworthy inferences using significance tests and confidence 
intervals about the regression parameters in the population which the studied sample 
was drawn from. This trustworthy inference holds true even in cases where the 
studied sample size is relatively small. This is because when the regression errors 
possess a normal distribution, OLS is the most efficient estimator of all unbiased 
estimators. 
Secondly, the study also points out that that one can have cases where none of the 
independent and dependant variables in the data sample possess a normal 
distribution, but the regression errors are still normally distributed, making it possible 
for one to draw trustworthy inferences from the regression analysis. Using simulation 
to generate a large sample of dichotomous variables13, the research study was able 
show that a strong relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependant variable may induce a bimodality to the marginal distribution of the 
dependant variable, even when the regression errors are normally distributed.  
The study concludes by pointing out that while the test of normality of the both the 
independent and dependent variables in the studied sample maybe useful for the 
sake of being able to describe the distribution of the data points, it has less of 
bearing on whether the OLS assumptions for regression analysis are actually met. 
This means then that it is essential for one to test how the errors from the regression 
model are distributed in order to determine how well they match the assumption of 
normally distributed errors for the regression analysis being undertaken. 
13 Dichotomous variables are variables which contain only two type of categories. 
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According to Weisberg (2005) the errors of a regression model cannot be directly 
observed, as it is often impossible for one to be able to ascertain the parameters of 
the true regression model. Instead, one can examine the properties of the error 
terms by computing the residuals of the estimated regression model developed from 
the observed sample data. The residuals are the difference between the observed 
dependant variable and the predicted dependant variable value. 
Using the two dependant variables in the data sample representing institutional 
shareholder stakes in companies, namely percentage of ordinary shares owned by 
institutional investors and the number of institutional investors owning shares in each 
company, residuals of the regression models used in the study was generated. To 
test for the assumption that the residuals are normally distributed, a significance test 
for normality and a graphical visual test were used. 
The results of the Shapiro-Wilk normality test for all the residuals is shown in Table 
11 and Table 12 below, which provide sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of a normal distribution for all the residuals involving both dependant 
variables.  
Table 11 Model 1 Residuals - Shapiro-Wilk normal distribution test 
Residuals with the dependant variable being the percentage shareholding by 
institutional Investors 
Variable Obs Statistic df z Prob>z 
Res_1 254 0.95512 8.253 4.914 0.0000 
Res_2 254 0.95495 8.285 4.923 0.0000 
Res_3 231 0.94473 9.351 5.181 0.0000 
Res_4 244 0.94807 9.219 5.162 0.0000 
Res_5 253 0.94946 9.263 5.182 0.0000 
Res_6 231 0.94483 9.335 5.177 0.0000 
Res_7 244 0.94636 9.522 5.237 0.0000 
Res_8 253 0.95058 9.057 5.13 0.0000 
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Table 12  Model 2 Residuals - Shapiro-Wilk normal distribution test 
Residuals with the dependant variable being the number of institutional Investors 
Variable Obs Statistic Df z Prob>z 
Res_1 254 0.96957 5.597 4.01 0.00003 
Res_2 254 0.97682 4.263 3.376 0.00037 
Res_3 231 0.96523 5.884 4.107 0.00002 
Res_4 244 0.97529 4.386 3.436 0.0003 
Res_5 253 0.97252 5.036 3.764 0.00008 
Res_6 231 0.9677 5.466 3.936 0.00004 
Res_7 244 0.98173 3.244 2.734 0.00312 
Res_8 253 0.98066 3.544 2.946 0.00161 
As previously discussed, in order for one to reach a well informed decision on the 
normality of the data, the graphical tests must also be considered. From the visual 
inspection of data plots of the residuals presented in the form of histograms and 
Q-Q plots in Figure 2 below, it is clear that the residuals generated from the
dependant variables representing percentage of ordinary shares owned by 
institutional investors are not normally distributed, whilst those from the dependant 
variable representing the number of institutional investors owning shares in each 
company possess a normal distribution. 
Histogram Q-Q Plots









































(b) Residuals with the dependant variable being the number of Institutional Investors
Figure 2 Residuals - Graphical normal distribution test 
A complete set of the visual tests for normality conducted on the residuals from the 
models featuring both dependant variables are provided in Appendix D. From there 
one can see further evidence that for all the models where percentage shareholder 
by institutional shareholders is applied as the dependant variable, the residuals are 
not normality distributed.  However, for all the residuals for the dependant variable 
measured as the number of institutional investors holding shares in each company, 
the residuals seem to be normally distributed. 
Therefore, the percentage shareholding by institutional shareholders could not be 
used in this study, as the residuals involving this dependant variable are not normally 
distributed and therefore violate one of the important assumptions of the OLS 
regression technique.  Although the assumption of normally distributed errors is not 
required to provide unbiased and consistent regression coefficients when conducting 
regressions analysis, it is conditional that when this occurs the other OLS 
assumptions must be met (Grajales et al., 2013). Within this study it was also 
established that some of the other assumption are not met. Therefore any regression 
models involving percentage shareholder by institutional shareholders as dependant 
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Additionally, when it comes to small data samples, the violations of the normality 
distribution of the regression errors leads to untrustworthy inferences (Grajales et al., 
2013). This meant that the rest of the current research study will focus only on the 
number of institutional investors holding shares in a company as a measure 
institutional shareholding. This is not only done to ensure that the regression model 
used in the study results in unbiased and consistent regression coefficients, but it 
also to ensure that the regression models used will result in trustworthy inferences 
on the relationship between the independent and dependant variables. 
The next regression assumption test conducted was for multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity occurs when there is correlation among independent variables. 
According to Wooldridge (2009), when variables are correlated, it becomes 
extremely difficult for the OLS model to determine the true effect of independent 
variables on the dependant variable. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is used in this 
study to assess multicollinearity, as it is one of the most commonly used and 
powerful measures of multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2013).  
Table 13 on the next page shows the results of the VIF procedure to test for 
multicollinearity on two of the models applied in the study (see Appendix E for a 
complete set of test results). This confirmed that for all the models used in the study 
none suffer from multicollinearity. A rule of thumb in the research literature is that a 
VIF that is equal or less than four indicates that there are no multicollinearity issues 
with the independent variables, and a VIF equal of greater than ten may suggest 
high multicollinearity, which may require further investigation by the researcher 
(Chatterjee & Hadi, 2012).  
The tolerance associated with each independent variable, defined here as the 1/VIF, 
is often used by researchers to check on the degree of collinearity of the 
independent variables.  A VIF of 10 is comparable to a tolerance value of less than 
0.1 (StataCorp, 2013). 
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Table 13 Multicollinearity test 
Model 1 Model 2 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ESG     1.13 0.888047 
Log_ASSETS 1.11 0.897833 
ROA 1.05 0.948884 
LEVERAGE 1.05 0.950838 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ESG 1.14 0.875734 
LEVERAGE 1.08 0.922119 
Log_ASSETS 1.08 0.922616 
ROE 1.08 0.926969 
Lastly, the models used were tested for the both heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. OLS regressions are based on the assumption that the regression 
errors are independent (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2012). Autocorrelation occurs when this 
assumption is violated and error terms are found to be correlated. Correlated error 
terms present a number of issues in the regression analysis. Autocorrelation not only 
results in biased OLS estimates of standard errors and significance levels, but also 
leads to inefficient estimation of the regression coefficients (Grajales et al., 2013). 
To test for autocorrelation this research study applied the Wooldridge (2002) test for 
autocorrelation as suggested by Torres‐Reyna (2007). The Wooldridge (2002) test 
for autocorrelation is the preferred method to test for autocorrelation due to the fact 
that it is easy to apply and requires few assumptions. It has also been found to have 
powerful properties even when applied to small data samples (Drukker, 2003). The 
null hypothesis for the test is that the regression errors in the models are 
independent, and a p-value greater than 0.05 indicates that there is an 
autocorrelation of errors.  
Figure 3 below presents the results for the Autocorrelation test. From there one can 
see that autocorrelation is reported as present. For the remainder of the 
Autocorrelation tests see Appendix F. 
52 
Model 1 Model 2 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation H0: no first order autocorrelation 
       F(  1,      65) =   17.193    F(  1,      65) =   16.563 
    Prob > F =    0.0001   Prob > F =    0.0001 
Figure 3 Autocorrelation tests 
One of the assumption for OLS regressions is that of homoscedasticity.  
Homoscedasticity is defined as the constant variance in the regression errors across 
all the independent variables in the regression model. Heteroscedasticity is present 
where the variance in the error terms is found to be non-constant among the different 
independent variables. 
According to Weisberg (2005), when the variance in the regression errors is different 
across the independent variables, under the condition that there is no autocorrelation 
occurring, the OLS estimators can still be unbiased and consistent but will not be 
regarded as efficient. Without an efficient estimator from the OLS regression 
technique, the effect of heteroscedasticity is that the regressions analysis will result 
in untrustworthy inferences between the dependent and independent variables. The 
untrustworthy inferences are due to the fact that the calculated confidence intervals, 
as well the F test and t statics, are considered incorrect.  
To test for heteroscedasticity, Torres‐Reyna (2007) suggests that the StataCorp 
(2013) command xttest3 be used. The command computes a modified Wald statistic 
for GroupWise heteroscedasticity of the regression errors in a fixed effects 
regression model (Baum, 2001). The null hypothesis is homoskedasticity in the 
regression models, and a p-value greater than 0.05 indicates that heteroskedasticity 
is present. Results from the heteroscedasticity test as shown in Figure 4 below 
indicate that heteroscedasticity is present in the regression models used in the 
current research study. For the remainder of the heteroscedasticity tests see 
Appendix G. 
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Model 1 Model 2 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model in fixed effect regression model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (98)  =    5.2e+32 chi2 (98)  =    1.1e+33 
Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
Figure 4 Heteroscedasticity tests 
To account and address the problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the 
regression models and to ensure that the OLS estimates standard errors are robust 
and consistent, the Huber-White estimation method for standard errors was applied 
(StataCorp, 2013). The Huber-White or sandwich estimator is a well-known 
correction method which can be applied in the OLS regression analysis to obtain 
better confidence intervals, F tests and t statics, by correcting the asymptotic 
standard errors and producing robust standard errors (Maas & Hox, 2004). 
According to Maas and Hox (2004), in instances where there is heteroscedasticity in 
the regression model, the Huber-White estimator remains a consistent estimator of 
the covariances of the regression coefficients. The outcome is that inferences based 
on the robust standard errors become less dependent on the assumption of 
normality but at the cost of sacrificing some statistical power. 
3.6 Regression Procedure and Models 
The following section describes the regression method used to examine the 
relationship between institutional shareholding and CSP.  
As indicated above, the study employed a fixed effects panel regression model to 
explore the relationship between institutional shareholding and CSP. The research 
literature on the relationship between institutional shareholding and CSP does not 
provide a clear guideline on the appropriate length of the lagged effect of institutional 
ownership and CSP. Most previous studies on the topic applied one year lags 
(Graves & Waddock, 1994; Cox et al., 2004; Mahoney & Robert, 2007; Fauzi et al., 
2007; Hoq et al., 2010). This study therefore also applied a one year lagged effect 
between the institutional ownership and CSP data, following the method applied in 
the previous studies (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Mahoney & Robert, 2007).  
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To investigate the research question regarding the relationship between institutional 
shareholding and CSP, the study utilises eight separate regressions models using 
panel data. In all eight regressions models, the number of institutional investors 
holding shares in a company is a proxy for institutional ownership. 
Consistent with the method applied by Cox et al. (2004) and Mahoney and Robert, 
(2007) two of the eight regressions models used in the study included a composite 
measure of CSP measured by the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score. In addition to 
using size and leverage as the control variables, the first regression model also used 
ROA as the financial performance control variable, with the second model using 
ROE to measure financial performance. 
Furthermore, six similar regressions were performed, but these included the 
individual components of CSP in place of the composite measure of CSP, to capture 
the different forms of CSP. The different forms of CSP were measured by the three 
different components of the Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores, namely the 
Environmental Disclosure Score, followed by the Social Disclosure Score and the 
Governance Disclosure Score. 
The panel regression models for the study were thus as follows: 
Model 1 
Yi,t = β0 + β1ESGi,t-1 + β2ROAi,t-1 + β3SIZEi,t-1 +β4LEVERAGEi,t -1+ αi+ εi,t
Model 2 
Yi,t = β0 + β1ESGi,t-1 + β2ROEi,t-1 + β3SIZEi,t-1 +β4LEVERAGEi,t -1+ αi+ εi,t
Model 3 
Yi,t = β0 + β1Envi,t-1 + β2ROAi,t-1 + β3SIZEi,t-1 +β4LEVERAGEi,t -1+ αi+ εi,t
Model 4 
Yi,t = β0 + β1Soci,t-1 + β2ROAi,t-1 + β3SIZEi,t-1 +β4LEVERAGEi,t -1+ αi+ εi,t
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Model 5 
Yi,t = β0 + β1Govi,t-1 + β2ROAi,t-1 + β3SIZEi,t-1 +β4LEVERAGEi,t -1+ αi+ εi,t
Model 6 
Yi,t = β0 + β1Envi,t-1 + β2ROEi,t-1 + β3SIZEi,t-1 +β4LEVERAGEi,t -1+ αi+ εi,t
Model 7 
Yi,t = β0 + β1Soci,t-1 + β2ROEi,t-1 + β3SIZEi,t-1 +β4LEVERAGEi,t -1+ αi+ εi,t
Model 8 
Yi,t = β0 + β1Govi,t-1 + β2ROEi,t-1 + β3SIZEi,t-1 +β4LEVERAGEi,t -1+ αi+ εi,t
Where Yi,t is the dependent variable as measured by the number of institutional 
investors holding the outstanding shares of each company, i, at time t. The 
independent variables are represented as follows: ESG represents the Bloomberg 
ESG disclosure score, Env represents the Bloomberg environmental disclosure 
score and Soc represents the Bloomberg social disclosure score and Gov represents 
the Bloomberg governance score. ROA is Return on Assets and ROE is Return on 
Equity, both measuring the company’s financial performance. SIZE represents the 
natural logarithm of total assets and LEVERAGE represents total debt over total 
assets. The identity of each company is represented by i, and t represents the time 
period, while t-1 shows the effect of the lagged dependant variable. β0 represents the 
shared constant term in the model and β is the coefficient of all the independent 
variables, α is the unobserved individual company effect and ε represents the error 
term. 
This next chapter discusses the regression results. 
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter the regression results of the current study are discussed, which are 
then compared to those of previous research studies. Additional commentary is 
supplied to justify and analyse the findings of the study. 
4.1 Regression results 
4.1.1 Regression results for the composite measure of CSP 
The results of the regressions of the composite CSP measure (Bloomberg’s ESG 
score) against institutional shareholding are presented in Table 14 below. The 
results show that a statistically significant relationship could not be established 
between ESG disclosure and institutional shareholding, therefore failing to find 
evidence to support Hypothesis 1. Both models featuring the composite measure of 
ESG disclosure have a low positive coefficient of determination (0.07 and 0.06 for 
Model 1 and Model 2 respectively), which indicates a poor fit. The F-Statistics for 
both models are also insignificant.  
Table 14 Regression Results for Models 1 and 2 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
(t-Values in brackets) ROA ROE 
Dependent variable: 
Number of institutional Investors 
Independent variables: 
ESG disclosure score 0.1071 (0.09) 0.1834 (0.15) 
Control variables : 
ROA 2.9314** (2.19) 
ROE 1.9382** (2.10) 
Size -24.6731 (-1.18) -28.4536 (-1.31)
Leverage 9.8159 (0.21) 8.2905 (0.18)
R Square 0.0667 0.0608 
F-Statistic 1.83 1.97 
Type of panel data Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
Huber–White standard errors applied Yes Yes 
Number of observations 254 254 
Significance at the 10% level * 
Significance at the 5% level ** 
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A look at the control variables (see Table 14) indicate mixed results. The coefficients 
for the financial performance control variables are positive and similar for both 
Models 1 and 2. The difference is in their size, with ROA having a larger coefficient 
than ROE, but both variables are significant at the 10% significance level. 
Additionally, even though the control variable for size possesses a negative 
coefficient and the leverage control variable a positive one, neither of these variables 
were found to have a statistical significant relationship with institutional shareholding. 
4.1.2 Regression results for the components of CSP 
With the first two regression results of the study having failed to find any significant 
evidence to support the hypothesized positive relationship between the composite 
measure of CSP and institutional shareholding, the next step was to explore whether 
the evidence supports Petersen and Vredenburg (2009) suggestion that institutional 
investors may be interested in the specific components of CSP. The regression 
results of the models that respectively tested the different aspects of CSP (the 
environmental, social and governance components of ESG disclosure) against 
number of institutional shareholders, are discussed next. 
As can be observed from Table 15 and Table 16 below, no statistically significant 
relationship could be established between institutional shareholding for both 
environmental and social disclosure, therefore failing to find evidence to support 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. The research study was, however, able to find evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 4, having established a statistical significant positive 
relationship between a company’s governance disclosure and its institutional 
shareholding at the 5% significance level. 
The regression results from Models 3, 4, 6 and 7, featuring the independent 
variables environmental disclosure and social disclosure, suffer from a low R square 
values, and all have statistically insignificant F-Statistics. The coefficient signs for 
social disclosure scores are showing mixed results, with Model 4 showing a negative 
sign and Model 7 the opposite. The coefficient for all environmental disclosure 
scores are positive. 
Models 5 and 8, which feature the governance disclosure as the independent 
variable, both have a significant F-Statistic at the 5% significance level, and 
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respectively explain 9.75% and 8.61% of the variance in institutional shareholding. 
According to the predictions of Model 5, holding all other variables constant, a 1% 
increase in the governance disclosure score in the preceding year leads to a 2.6 
increase in the number of institutional investors holding shares in that particular 
company in the following year. According to the predictions of Model 8, the 
corresponding increase in the number of institutional investors is 2.4. 
Table 15 Regression Results for Models 3 to 5 
Variables Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 








Number of institutional investors 
Independent variables: 
Environmental disclosure score 0.2350 (0.22) 
Social disclosure score -0.0777 (-0.08)
Governance disclosure score 2.6133** (2.34) 
Control variables: 
ROA 2.6386* (1.77) 2.6499* (1.77) 2.8827** (2.21) 
Size -10.4489 (-0.41) -24.2093 (-0.93) -32.1984* (-1.73)
Leverage 8.1832 (0.17) 12.58997 (0.26) 18.3303 (0.40)
R Squared 0.0482 0.0539 0.0975 
F-Statistic 1.01 1.28 3.29** 
Type of panel data Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
Huber–White standard errors applied Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 231 244 253 
Significance at the 10% level * 
Significance at the 5% level ** 
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Table 16 Regression Results for Models 6 to 8 
Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 








Number of institutional Investors 
Independent variables: 
Environmental disclosure score 0.3845 (0.34) 
Social disclosure score 0.0878 (0.09) 
Governance disclosure score 2.3912** (2.13) 
Control variables : 
ROE 2.0246* (1.92) 1.7802* (1.75) 1.7927* (1.98) 
Size -16.9063 (-0.64) -32.6730 (-1.22) -35.2715* (-1.82)
Leverage 14.4133 (0.31) 14.5896 (0.31) 14.1914 (0.32)
R Squared 0.0525 0.0513 0.0861 
F-Statistic 1.26 1.43 3.18** 
Type of panel data Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
Huber–White standard errors applied Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 231 244 253 
Significance at the 10% level * 
Significance at the 5% level ** 
The regression results featuring the governance disclosure as the independent 
variable are not only showing statistically significant results but they are also 
displaying an improvement in the explanatory power of the regression models 
compared to all the other six models. Additionally one can observe that the co-
efficient for the governance variable is very large compared to the other ESG 
disclosure components.  
The financial performance control variable for five of the six models featuring the 
components of ESG disclosure were found to be significant at the 10% significance 
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level. The positive relationship for the financial performance control variables was 
stronger for Model 5, which features governance disclosure as the independent CSP 
variable compared to Model 3 and 4, which feature the Social and Environmental 
disclosure, improving the significance level from 10% to 5%. According to the 
predictions of Model 5, when holding all other independent variables constant a 1% 
increase in ROA in the preceding year leads to a 2.9 increase in in the number of 
institutional investors holding shares in that particular company in the year after. 
Results from the rest of the control variables are as follows: 
The control variable for size was found to be significant at the 10% level for all the 
models featuring governance disclosure component as the independent variable, but 
insignificant for all the models featuring the other ESG components. The co-efficient 
for all the models has been found to be negative, indicating a negative relationship 
between the size of a company and the institutional shareholding. For the majority of 
the models featuring ESG components (four out of six) this relationship could not be 
shown with any reasonable statistical significance, and even for the two remaining 
models the relationship had relatively weak statistical power at a significance level of 
only around 10%.  
Lastly, the relationship between institutional shareholding and the control variable for 
leverage remained statistical insignificant throughout.  
4.2  Analysis and discussion of results 
The next section provides a detailed discussion of the observed regression results, 
while providing a comparison with results from previous research studies. 
4.2.1 Overall CSP results 
The failure to find statistically significant results  in support of the hypothesis that 
there is a positive relationship between institutional shareholding and the composite 
measure of CSP, means that there is no strong evidence in the studied sample to 
support  the results found by both Graves and Waddock (1994) and Mahoney and 
Roberts (2007) . Both these studies found a positive significant relationship between 
a composite measure of CSP and institutional shareholding, the former using the 
KLD system to measure CSP for 430 US companies between the years 1990 and 
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1991, and the latter using Jantzi Research Inc. (JRI) ratings to measure CSP for 298 
Canadian companies from the year 1996 to 1999. 
The country dynamics could be a significant contributor to the difference in the 
research findings between the studies highlighted above and the current study. 
Unlike the developed economies such as the USA and Canada, which have well 
developed SRI industries. Thus, for example, the 2016 report by the US Social 
Investment Forum (US SIF) on Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing 
Trends in the US notes that funds which are managed with ESG factors incorporated 
into the investment analysis, have grown by 14 times since first measured in 1995, 
and now stand at $8.10 trillion, which represents nearly 22 percent of the $40.3 
trillion total funds under management (US SIF, 2016).  
On the other hand, South Africa, like the other the emerging markets, still faces 
many challenges in the development of SRI. One of those challenges is the lack of 
skills by investment professionals involved in SRI, as pointed out by Viviers (2007). 
Furthermore, as highlighted by Herringer et al. (2009), unlike the developed markets 
South Africa currently lacks credible local research to refute the belief by the majority 
of the institutional investors that SRI focus reduces returns compared to conventional 
investments. Additionally, South Africa also lacks well-resourced public institutions 
whose sole mandate is to promote SRI and to conduct and produce credible 
research on the growth and the economic benefits of SRI compared to conventional 
investments. In this regard, Europe has the Eurosif, the US has US Social 
Investment Forum (US SIF), and Canada has the Responsible Investment 
Association (RIA), to mention but a few. Thus, Viviers et al (2009) not surprisingly 
comment that more research and improved collaboration is vital to grow the South 
African SRI sector. 
The lack of a significant positive relationship in the current study between the 
composite measure of CSP and institutional shareholding is in line with De Jongh et 
al.’s (2007) survey, which found a lack of enthusiasm amongst South African 
institutional investors for the use ESG performance as an investment decision 
consideration. It is then plausible that this view may still be widely held by 
institutional investors, and this could therefore be the reason the current research 
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study was not able to establish a statistical significant relationship between 
institutional shareholding and the overall ESG disclosure. 
 Although there is an observed shortcoming with using ESG disclosure ratings as a 
proxy for CSP as discussed earlier in section 3.2.1, the most direct, and in many 
cases the only, way that investors have of judging a company’s CSP activities is 
indirectly through its ESG disclosure. Hence the CSR literature includes a significant 
number of research studies that have used ESG disclosure as proxy to measure a 
company’s CSP as indicated in the introduction and background section. Additionally 
it has been shown by Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), as discussed in detail earlier in section 
3.2.1, that increased ESG disclosure is related to increase CSP performance. 
Therefore these results indirectly seem to imply that institutional investors in the 
studied sample appear not to consider ESG factors in their investment decisions. 
Recent findings of a report compiled by Kigoda Consulting (2017)14 on the 
sustainable and responsible investment practices of South Africa’s biggest equity 
asset management companies can also help to explain the observed insignificant 
results for the composite measure of CSP. Focusing on the top ten asset 
management companies as end of June 2016, which at that point accounted for 
more than two thirds of the assets under management in South Africa. The Kigoda 
responsible investing ranking report utilises CRISA’s five principles and practice 
recommendations to ascertain whether these companies have the requisite policy 
frameworks and governance structure in place to be able to implement ESG 
investments, and to effectively disclose information on their responsible investment 
activities and performance. Each company’s performance against the CRISA 
principle was scored out of 100. The top performing company scored 82, but six out 
of the ten companies scored less than 50, with the lowest score being a 1.  
These findings show that there is a wide disparity in the implementation and 
adoption of responsible investment practices as outlined in CRISA by South African 
asset managers. The reports points out that although nine of the ten asset 
management companies assessed indicated in some form over the past 3 years that 
14 Kigoda Consulting is a Cape Town based independent consultancy company specialising in research 
and analysis of political risk and environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues across sub-
Saharan Africa. (Kigoda Consulting, 2017) 
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they endorse CRISA, this seems to be some form of “green washing”,  especially by 
the poor performers. The reports notes that only five of ten assessed asset 
management companies supplied information detailing the governance structures 
and internal controls which these companies have implemented to ensure sufficient 
support for the responsible investment approach mandated by CRISA. Additionally 
only four of the institutional investors employ special staff focused on responsible 
investments. 
According to a survey by Moodley (2013), the view by some South African 
institutional investors is that there are significant costs associated with integration of 
ESG principles in investment practices. The institutional investors thus pointed out 
that additional staff often have to be employed to implement and screen investee 
companies that do not meet ESG investment standards. Additionally, the adoption of 
CRISA increases the operational costs of doing business, as the Institutional 
investors have to invest financial resources in new investment processes and 
information systems to monitor and manage the compliance with the investment 
codes.   
The Kigoda Consulting (2017) report clearly indicates that there is still a significant 
amount of work to be done before the majority of institutional investors can claim to 
be meeting their CRISA commitments. Thus, at the present moment, there seems to 
be some credibility to the current studies’ findings that South African institutional 
investors in the studied sample do not yet, with the exception of governance 
(discussed below), seem to factor ESG issues into their investment decisions.  
The non-significant results from the current research study with regards to the 
composite measure of CSP, add credence to the proposition by Carroll (1979) that 
CSP should be treated as a multi-dimensional construct. The study failed to find a 
statistical significant relationship between institutional shareholding and the 
composite measure of CSP, but was able show a statistical significant positive 
relationship with regards to one of the components of CSP, as is discussed in the 
following sections. 
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4.2.2 Environmental based CSP 
Even though the coefficient for environmental based CSP was positive, no significant 
relationship could be established between environmental based CSP and 
institutional shareholding, and therefore the study failed to find sufficient evidence 
either to support the research findings by Wahba (2008), or to dispute the findings by 
Mahoney and Roberts (2007). An emerging market study done by Wahba (2008) on 
156 Egyptian companies in the year 2006 using certification for the international 
environmental management system standard ISO 14001 to measure a company’s 
environmental performance,  found a positive significant relationship between 
environmental based CSP  and institutional shareholding. Mahoney and Roberts 
(2007) study for 298 Canadian companies using Jantzi Research Inc. (JRI) 
environmental ratings which are based on the company’s environmental policies and 
product safety records in years from 1996 to 1999, found a negative significant 
relationship between environmental performance and institutional shareholding. 
There are two main factors that could explain why the current study could not 
establish any form of relationship between environmental based CSP and 
institutional shareholding in the South African context. 
The first is that the research on sustainability reporting indicated that environmental 
issues are the least reported by the majority of South African companies. Thus the 
discussion document by Baskin and Gordon (2005) on the state of corporate 
responsibility practices of emerging market companies highlighted that although 
South African companies were seen to be global leaders when it comes to 
sustainable reporting regarding social issues, the companies seem to be less 
advanced when it comes to environmental issues. This was based on the evidence 
from the 2004 KPMG survey of integrated sustainability reporting in South Africa, 
compiled by Visser (2004). 
Furthermore, using a sample of 23 companies, which consisted of the best 
performing companies listed on the JSE’s SRI index between the years 2010 and 
2011, Van Zyl (2013) investigated the extent in which South African companies are 
promoting environmental sustainability. Using the sustainability and integrated 
reports of the companies, the research study found that the level of disclosures 
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relating to environmental sustainability by the companies remain very low. Instead of 
having quantitative disclosures, the companies are found to be using the 
environments disclosures for publicity and to make the companies look good using 
qualitative statements.  
For South African companies a further complication is the many reporting options 
available. Janse van Rensburg and Struwig (2016), in an article on sustainability 
reporting in South Africa, point out that, besides the seventeen reporting standards 
internationally plus the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) general standard 
disclosure and indicators, South Africa has twelve initiatives of its own on 
sustainability reporting. These locally developed initiatives are made up of both 
mandatory legislative requirements and voluntary guidance initiatives, which have 
been created not only by the government but also by the JSE and South African 
market regulators. 
The second plausible reason why this study failed to establish a relationship is with 
regard to the distinct measurement methods used to measure the environmental 
performance of a company. If one looks at the current research study, the descriptive 
statistics indicate that environmental issues in the studied sample are the least 
reported among the ESG disclosure components, as can be seen from it having the 
lowest amount of observations of the three CSP elements in the current study (see 
Table 6). In addition, in the research literature there is ambiguity with regards to the 
proper measurement of environmental performance, with different researchers using 
very different proxies to measure environmental performance - see, for example, the 
unique environmental proxies used by Mahoney and Roberts (2007) and Wahba 
(2008).  
4.2.3 Social based CSP 
The regression results for social based CSP coefficients showed mixed results, with 
one model finding a positive coefficient and the other a negative one. However, 
neither of the coefficients found were statistically significant, and hence no 
meaningful relationship could be established between social based CSP and 
institutional shareholding, failing to find sufficient evidence to either support the 
research findings by Coffey and Fryxell (1991) or that of Saleh et al. (2010). The 
Malaysian market study done by Saleh et al. (2010), using community involvement to 
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measure social based CSP for 499 companies, found a negative significant 
relationship between social based CSP and institutional shareholding, whilst US 
study by Coffey and Fryxell (1991), using the number of women on the board of 
directors as a proxy for social performance, found a positive significant relationship 
between social based CSP and institutional shareholding.  
The possible reason why the current research study could not establish a 
relationship between the two variables, could be the reasons advanced by Eccles et 
al. (2011). As discussed earlier in this document, Eccles et al. (2011) suggest that 
the overall interest of investors is more on environmental and governance 
performance information than it is on social performance information. The stronger 
interest in environmental information could be attributed to the fact that unlike social 
issues, the majority of the environmental effects are simpler to quantify and to 
integrate into the valuation of companies. This argument is supported by research 
findings of Hoq et al. (2010), which suggest that funds which are donated towards 
good causes do not actually show the true extent of how much a company is actual 
socially responsible. Additionally, there is ambiguity with regards to the extent of how 
much activities such as philanthropy by the company actually help the company’s 
public image towards its stakeholders.  
From the above it is then plausible that one of the reasons that a relationship 
between social based CSP and institutional shareholding could not be established in 
the current research study, could be due to the fact that institutional investors find it 
hard to quantify the benefits of social activities of a company, and hence do not 
consider them in the investment decision.  
4.2.4 Governance based CSP 
As indicated in section 3.2.1, the few research studies on the relationship between 
CSP and institutional shareholding have focused on environmental and social based 
CSP, and have largely neglected governance based CSP. This is likely due to the 
fact that many of the measurement techniques used by researchers as company 
CSP proxies, such as KLD and EIRiS, only concentrate on the social and 
environmental issues, and do not consider governance. By employing Bloomberg 
ESG disclosure scores as a proxy for CSP, this study becomes to the author’s 
knowledge the first to use all three components of ESG to explore how CSP 
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influences institutional shareholding. This means that no comparison can be made 
between the current study and previous research studies, with regards to the 
relationship between governance based CSP and institutional shareholding. 
As hypothesized, the research study did find a positive significant relationship 
between governance based CSP and institutional shareholding. There are a number 
of plausible reasons of why this positive relationship between the two variables was 
established. The first one is that the majority of research studies on corporate 
governance and its influence on the company’s financial performance have shown 
that better corporate governance has a positive effect on financial performance15.  
Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) extensive survey of corporate governance research 
studies from the emerging markets, covering the period from 1987 to 2011, 
considers the many ways in which corporate governance may be important and how 
it affects companies in the different emerging markets, with a special focus on 
markets in Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Middle East, and Southeast Asia. 
Some of the corporate governance research topics discussed include results on the 
impacts of ownership structure on corporate governance, the relationship between 
the company’s ownership structure and financial performance, and the effects of 
legislative changes by the country on the company’s corporate governance. The 
findings of the survey show that that companies in emerging markets are still faced 
with major corporate governance issues, which include factors such as the high 
prevalence of concentrated ownership structures, low institutional shareholding and 
having lack of access to outside funding. The study is able to show that an 
improvement in corporate governance creates a number of benefits for the company. 
Firstly it improves the chances of the company getting access to external funding, it 
lowers its cost of capital and it improves its financial performance. In addition to the 
highlighted financial benefits, corporate governance leads to better stakeholder 
relationships. To qualify its findings the study explains that the above benefits also 
rely on the strength of the country's governance systems. 
15 See, for example, Gompers et al. (2003); Cremers et al. (2005); Bhagat and Bolton (2008); Ammann 
et al. (2011); Essen et al. (2013); Zhu (2014); and Narayan et al. (2015). On the other hand, the findings 
of Core et al. (2006); Ertugrul and Hegde (2009); and Peni and Vähämaa (2012) are inconclusive. 
68 
The research results of the survey by Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) also provide 
further evidence to support the findings of the Kirkpatrick (2009) report, which 
highlighted that improved corporate governance has the ability of mitigate financial 
crises in the market economy.  The financial crises can occur when the impact of the 
failures and weaknesses in corporate governance of companies is large enough that 
it adversely affects whole market economy. A financials crisis not only has large 
economic costs but it has large social costs as well. This positive link between 
governance and improved financial performance could explain why institutional 
investors in the current research study have been found to be attracted to companies 
that display good disclosure scores. Additionally, the idea that institutional investors 
could be making investment decisions based on the investment merits of CSP 
support the findings of the previously mentioned research study by Petersen and 
Vredenburg (2009) on the motives of Canadian institutional investors in the oil and 
gas industry. 
A further possible reason why institutional investors are likely to invest more in 
companies that show good governance score relates to the findings of the research 
study by Shrivastava and Addas (2014). Using Bloomberg ESG ratings from the 
2011 financials report for US, European and Canadian companies from the S&P 
100, EURONEXT 100 and the S&P/TSX 60 respectively, the study examined 
whether better corporate governance leads to more sustainable company policies in 
general. To measure for the quality of corporate governance the research study used 
board meeting attendance, the percentage of independent directors on the board of 
directors and the overall governance disclosure score. The proxy for sustainability 
was the composite ESG disclosure scores and the environmental disclosure scores.  
The study found that sustainability scores (represented by both the composite ESG 
scores and the individual environmental disclosure scores) is greatly influenced by 
the governance disclosure scores. Furthermore, the study was able to show that 
companies who feature a large percentage of independent board of directors not 
only have higher sustainability disclosure but they are very likely to have developed 
and adopted climate change polices and are compliant with international 
sustainability standards like GRI. 
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In line with the above discussion, it is therefore possible that the positive relationship 
between governance disclosure and institutional shareholding found in this study is 
due to institutional investors viewing better corporate governance as having a 
positive effect on the company’s financial performance and adoption of sustainable 
policies. 
4.2.5 Control Variables 
The results for the control variables are discussed next. 
Financial Performance: The results of a positive relationship between the 
company’s financial performance and institutional shareholding support the findings 
of Cox et al. (2004) and Graves and Waddock (1994), who were able to show that 
good financial performance by a company often leads to an increase in institutional 
shareholding. Institutional investors are attracted by good financial performance 
because accounting profits are expected to eventually result in an increased share 
price (Johnson & Greening, 1999).  
Company Size: The negative coefficient of the size control variable, albeit only 
significant at the 10% level when governance based CSP was the main independent 
variable, could imply that the majority of the institutional investors on the JSE favour 
holding shares in small companies. This counterintuitive result was also found by 
Cox et al. (2004) in their study of UK short-term institutional investors, which found a 
significant negative relationship between institutional shareholding and company size 
as measured by assets.  
According to Yan and Zhang’s (2007) the preference of holding shares in small 
companies is often exhibited by short-term institutional investors, who are also 
known for only considering short-term financial rewards when making investment 
decisions. Yan and Zhang’s (2007) study of US institutional investor’s trading 
patterns from 1979 to 2003 found that short-term institutional investors were better 
informed compared to long-term institutional investors, and were better at predicting 
future share returns. The predictability was found to be stronger in small and growing 
shares than it is was for large well established companies. Short-term institutional 
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investors favoured investing in small companies due to the fact that the informational 
advantaged displayed by short-term institutional investors, was more in small 
companies due to the fact that these companies were faced with more uncertainty 
and the value of their shares is harder to evaluate.  
Based on the evidence of the Yan and Zhang’s (2007) and Cox et al. (2004) studies 
discussed above, with the observed results indicating that the majority of the 
institutional investors on the studied sample favour holding shares in small 
companies, this could also imply that by favouring to hold share in small companies, 
the investment behaviour of the institutional investors in the studied sample is one 
that is focused on short-term financial payoffs. This is also supported by the 
investment behaviour observed De Jongh et al. (2007) survey study of South African 
institutional investors. 
This view is also supported by Bennett et al. (2003) study of US institutional 
investor’s portfolio holdings and company’s characteristics for US listed companies 
from 1983 to 1997. The study showed that institutional investors seem to prefer 
smaller and riskier companies since these shares provide the greatest opportunity 
for financial gains on their informational advantages. However, since more than 74% 
of the companies in the current research study are classified either as FTSE/JSE 
Top 40 or FTSE/JSE Mid Cap companies, it becomes debatable whether any can be 
truly be identified as small companies, and hence to what extent the above 
arguments are relevant in this case. 
In general, though, the majority of studies have found a positive relationship between 
institutional shareholding and company size16. The main reasons why institutional 
shareholders are seen to favour larger well established companies, is due to these 
companies being mostly well-known and having built up sufficient resources, and 
they also having been shown to be less susceptible to financial failure. 
Leverage: Although none of the models found significant results for the coefficient of 
leverage, the finding for this variable were unexpected, as its coefficient was found to 
16 See, for example, Duggal and Millar (1999 ); Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) ; Huberman (2001) ; 
Ke and Petroni (2004) ; Elyasiani and Jia (2010); Hoq et al. (2010); and Saleh et al. (2010) 
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be positive. These results are unexpected in view of the assertion by Chaganti and 
Damanpour (1991) that the high risk of bankruptcy often associated with more 
indebted companies may discourage institutional investors from investing in these 
companies. Additionally the results contrast the findings of Mahoney and Roberts 
(2007), who studied institutional investors in Canada, and Tong and Ning (2004), 
who looked at the link between institutional investors in the US and companies’ 
capital structures. Both these studies found a significant negative relationship 
between institutional shareholding and leverage. 
A possible explanation for the positive coefficient on leverage for the studied sample 
of JSE-listed companies could be related to the findings of the survey conducted by 
Correia and Cramer (2008). This study, which investigated corporate finance 
practices of South African listed companies in relation to their cost of capital, capital 
structure and capital budgeting decisions, found that the majority of the companies in 
the studied sample exhibited low target debt-to-equity ratios, resulting in an 
exceptionally low use of debt financing. The study then argued that the majority of 
South African listed companies are highly undergeared, with negative implications 
for their returns on equity. Taking the findings of Correia and Cramer (2008) into 
account, the positive coefficient could mean (although there is not conclusive 
evidence in the current research study to support this assertion), that institutional 
investors are attracted to companies making efficient use of debt by borrowing more 
relative to an underleveraged sample group, thereby lowering their weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC), and improving shareholder returns. 
The next chapter provides the conclusion to this research study, discusses the 
research limitations, and puts forward suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research study set out to examine the relationship between CSP and 
companies’ institutional shareholding for a sample of companies listed on the South 
African Johannesburg Stock Exchange. With the majority of the studies on the 
dynamics of the relationship between the two variables being from developed 
countries, the study adds to the research literature on CSR by looking at the 
investment behaviour of institutional investors in response to companies’ CSP from 
an emerging market perspective.  
The study could not find evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between the composite measure of CSP and institutional shareholding. 
There was also no significant relationship between institutional shareholding and 
environmental and social based CSP.   
The results of this study appear to support previous findings (see De Jongh et al., 
2007) that companies’ overall CSP performance are not yet a major consideration in 
South African institutional investors’ equity investment decisions. The probable 
reasons behind this behaviour could be fact the that South Africa currently lacks 
credible research data to refute the notion that SRI investments produce inferior 
financial returns compared to conventional investments. Thus, as mentioned 
previously, South Africa currently lacks public institutions like Eurosif in Europe and 
US Social Investment Forum (US SIF) in the US. Furthermore there seems to be 
additional operational costs associated with the adoption of ESG investment codes 
like CRISA, leading to a number of the institutional investors’ “green washing” their 
commitment to ESG investing, as shown in Kigoda Consulting’s (2017) report.  
When it comes to the relationship between institutional shareholding and the three 
different forms of CSP as measured by Bloomberg E, S and G disclosure scores, the 
study finds statistically significant (at the 5% level) evidence for a positive 
relationship only for corporate governance, and not for the proxies used for 
environmental and social based CSP. The lack of firm results on environmental CSP 
can possibly in part be attributed to the lack of environmental disclosure by a 
majority of the companies operating in South Africa, and similarly, with regards to 
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social CSP, many institutional investors may find it hard to quantify the value add of 
CSR activities such a philanthropy to the company (Hoq et al., 2010).  
The statistically relationship found with regards to the governance based CSP and 
institutional shareholding is probably due to the widely accepted positive relationship 
between a company’s corporate governance and its financial performance 
(Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). The fact that the current study failed to establish a 
relationship between the composite measures of CSP but was able to find a positive 
relationship with one of the components of CSP provides additional evidence to 
support the argument by Carroll (1979) that CSP must be treated as a multi-
dimensional construct. The results also add support to the suggestion by Johnson 
and Greening (1999) that institutional investors distinguish between the different 
elements of CSP, and do not place the same weight on each in their investment 
decisions. 
The research outcomes of the study should be useful to both companies already 
listed on the JSE and those who are planning to do a public listing, as it can clarify 
the CSR issues the companies can focus on to attract institutional investors to their 
companies, apart from good financial performance.  
The identified limitation of the study is with regard to the availability of ESG data for 
JSE listed companies to be able to measure CSP. Even though the original sample 
of the companies listed on the FTSE/JSE Africa All Share Index (ALSI) consisted of 
237 companies, only 98 companies formed the final sample of the research study as 
the rest of the companies lacked Bloomberg ESG data. The other issue was the 
period covered by the research study. Due to credibility issues with regards to the 
institutional shareholder data, only three years of data (2014 to 2016) were available 
for use in the final research study. It is therefore suggested that this research topic 
be revisited by future researchers as more data becomes available, and the research 
period increases. A further suggestion for future research is to perhaps take a more 
qualitative approach involving surveys and interviews with asset managers and/or 
company management on their views of the desirability of ESG performance from an 
institutional investment perspective, as an update to the previous research. 
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APPENDIX A Graphical comparison of Transformed Variables. 
A graphical comparison of the variables before and after winsorization. 
ROA Normal Distribution Graph - Histogram 
Before Winsorization: After Winsorization: 
ROE Normal Distribution Graph - Histogram 












































-10.00 0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00
W_ROA_at_5% Normal Distribution













































-20.00 0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00
W_ROE_at_5% Normal Distribution
89 
Assets Normal Distribution Graph - Histogram 
Before Log: After Log: 
224








































6 8 10 12 14
log_ASSETS_at_5% Normal Distribution
90 
APPENDIX B Hausman Tests 
The Stata results of the Hausman test recommending that the Fixed Effects model 
be applied. 
Model 3 Model 4 
Model 5 Model 6 
Model 7 Model 8 
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
25.53
Prob>chi2  = 0.0000
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
23.93
Prob>chi2  = 0.0001
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
30.49
Prob>chi2  = 0.0000
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
25.51
Prob>chi2  = 0.0000
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
24.65
Prob>chi2  = 0.0001
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
30.53
Prob>chi2  = 0.0000
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APPENDIX C Histogram and Normal Q-Q Plots (All Variables) 
Graphical Tests for normality for all the variables used in the study. 
Dependant Variables 
Percentage shareholder by Institutional shareholders - Histogram and Normal Q-Q Plots 
Histogram Q-Q Plots
Number of Institutional Investors - Histogram and Normal Q-Q Plots 
Histogram Q-Q Plots
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Leverage - Histogram and Normal Q-Q Plots 
Histogram Q-Q Plots
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Bloomberg Environmental Disclosure Scores - Histogram and Normal Q-Q Plots 
Histogram Q-Q Plots
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APPENDIX D Histogram and Normal Q-Q Plots (Residuals) 
Graphical Tests for normality for the residuals from the models featuring both 
dependant variables. 
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APPENDIX E Multicollinearity Tests 






































APPENDIX F Autocorrelation Tests 
Autocorrelation tests for the remainder of the regression models. 
Model 3 Model 4 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation H0: no first order autocorrelation 
 F(  1,      54) =    17.965   F(  1,      58) =    21.933 
  Prob > F =    0.0001   Prob > F =    0.0000 
Model 5 Model 6 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation H0: no first order autocorrelation 
 F(  1,      65) =    17.221   F(  1,      54) =    19.027 
  Prob > F =    0.0001   Prob > F =    0.0001 
Model 7 Model 8 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation H0: no first order autocorrelation 
  F(  1,      58) =    24.748  F(  1,      65) =    16.630 
  Prob > F =    0.0000   Prob > F =    0.0001 
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APPENDIX G Heteroscedasticity Tests 
Heteroscedasticity tests for the remainder of the regression models. 
Model 3 Model 4 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model in fixed effect regression model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (94)  =    6.2e+32 chi2 (97)  =    8.6e+34 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Model 5 Model 6 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model in fixed effect regression model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (98)  =    8.0e+31 chi2 (94)  =    1.5e+32 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Model 7 Model 8 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model in fixed effect regression model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
chi2 (97)  =    1.3e+32 chi2 (98)  =    2.1e+33 
Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 Prob>chi2 =  0.0000 
